Breach of Fiduciary Duty: The Enduring Duty

Robert A. Borissoff v. Taylor & Faust et al., 33 Cal. 4th 523 (Cal. 2004)

CA Underlying probate matters

Student Contributor: Evan Michael Hess

Facts: A special administrator in probate court retained the Defendants Taylor and Faust to provide assistance in tax matters relating to the execution of a will. Without authorization, the administrator borrowed approximately $115,000 from the estate for personal reasons. After some time, the administrator sought assistance from Defendant Faust. Faust later informed the administrator that he could no longer provide representation. Representation was then assumed by attorney McGovern. An IRS form was not filed by McGovern, which would have extended for three years the estate’s rights to claim a tax refund for administrative expenses related to the will contest. A malpractice action was initiated against Faust and McGovern, to which both Defendants asserted affirmative defenses that that they owed no duty as attorneys to plaintiff, with whom they did not stand in privity of contract, and that the statute of limitations barred plaintiff's claims. The Court of Appeals agreed, as did the trial court, that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the defendants.

Issue: May the successor fiduciary of an estate in probate assert a professional negligence claim against attorneys retained by a predecessor fiduciary to provide tax assistance for the benefit of the estate?

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that:

1) “[the probate] code's relevant provisions strongly support the inference that a successor fiduciary does have standing to sue an attorney retained by a predecessor fiduciary to give tax advice for the benefit of the estate”;
2) “While privity of contract may not exist, the successor has the same powers and duties as the predecessor, including the power to sue”; and
3) the successor’s fiduciary must have standing to sue the predecessor’s attorney for malpractice if the successor is to have standing to sue for the same.

Lesson: Even if  privity of contract does not exist, if an attorney breaches a duty to a predecessor, a successor fiduciary may sue the attorney for malpractice.

Getting Snagged for Legal Malpractice by Plaintiff's Successor in Interest

 In re Segerstrom 247 F. 3d 218 (5th Cir. 2001)

TX: Underlying personal injury then bankruptcy, post judgment

Student Contributor: Brad Kvinta (J.D. (2010), Texas Tech University School of Law, B.S. (2006)Texas A & M University)

FACTS: In 1995, a vehicle driven by Kayla Segerstrom (Segerstrom) was involved in a collision with a vehicle driven by the Colvins. The collision caused one death and other serious injuries. The Colvins sued Segerstrom, her parents, and her parents’ sole proprietorship (“defendants”). The defendants’ insurance company hired Touchstone as defense counsel. A judgment was then entered solely against Segerstrom. Shortly thereafter, “the Colvins filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Segerstrom.” The bankruptcy estate (“estate”) then filed a complaint against Touchstone and the insurance company. “The complaint alleged that Touchstone had an inherent conflict of interest in representing Segerstrom, her parents, and her parents’ sole proprietorship as defendants in the same litigation.” “In October 1998, Segerstrom’s personal liability to the Colvins was discharged.” Summary judgment was entered against the estate, and the trustee appealed.

ISSUE: Whether Segerstrom’s bankruptcy estate included a legal malpractice claim against Touchstone and, if so, whether Touchstone, and the insurance company, are liable under that claim?

RULING: On appeal, the court indicated that Segerstrom’s bankruptcy estate included a legal malpractice claim against Touchstone. “As of the commencement of Segerstrom’s bankruptcy case, a legal malpractice claim against Touchstone had accrued to Segerstrom according to Texas law.” See In re Swift, 129 F.3d 792, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1997). “Segerstrom never denied or waived that malpractice action prior to the commencement of her bankruptcy.” Thus, the court indicated that the estate could maintain a legal malpractice claim against Touchstone.

Although the court indicated that a legal malpractice action could be filed on behalf of the estate, the estate did not prove that “but for the manner in which Touchstone conducted her defense, Segerstrom would have obtained a better result in the prior litigation.” In other words, the estate failed to prove the Segerstrom suffered any injury as a result of the alleged malpractice.

The court based this conclusion on Segerstrom’s post-petition affidavit, which denied the existence of a legal malpractice claim. The court noted that although this affidavit is irrelevant to the existence of a legal malpractice claim, it “carries considerable weight in determining whether the estate has met its burden of establishing injury and causation in accordance with Texas law.” Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Touchstone was proper.

Further, “Texas requires that insurance companies act with reasonable care in fulfilling their duty to defend under insurance contracts.” See Meridian Oil Production, Inc. v. Hartford Accident, 27 F.3d 150, 153 (5th Cir. 1994). The court indicated that the estate pointed to no authority in Texas that shows this duty requires the insurance company to identify conflicts and take steps to address them prior to hiring legal counsel for its insured. The court also indicated that even if this duty existed, there is insufficient evidence presented to support a breach of that duty. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of the insurance company was proper.

LESSON: Lawyers may be liable for legal malpractice to a plaintiff’s successor in interest. A successor in interest is a person entitled to the same legal rights as the plaintiff. In other words, a successor in interest is free to pursue any claim that the plaintiff was entitled to pursue. Thus, a lawyer must defend a legal malpractice claim against a successor in interest so long as the successor in interest is legally entitled to pursue such a claim and meets all requirements to successfully prosecute the claim.


In this case, legal malpractice claims survive the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, even if personal liability in the underlying lawsuit has been discharged. Trustees (the successor in interest in this case) are free to pursue any claims which the debtor could have pursued prior to the initiation of a bankruptcy proceeding. Further, there is no duty under Texas law for an insurance company to identify conflicts and take steps to rectify said conflicts prior to the commencement of any legal proceeding.

Shifting and Sharing the Blame to others for Legal Malpractice

Cherry Hill Manor Associates v. Faugno (N.J.Super.A.D., 2004) (PDF) reversed by 182 N.J. 64 (2004)

NJ Underlying Real Estate and Litigation

Student Contributor: John Anzalone

Facts:   Plaintiff retained Attorney 1 to represent it in a real-estate purchase. After the transaction failed, Plaintiff retained Attorney 2 to recover its deposit from seller. Attorney 2 failed to add a claim for legal malpractice against Attorney 1 in the suit. Plaintiff then hired Attorney #3, the Defendant, to file a malpractice claim against Attorney 1, but the suit was dismissed because he should have been sued in the case against the seller Attorney #2. Plaintiff then filed a malpractice complaint against Attorney 2 for failure to include Attorney 1 in the suit against the seller, but the suit was dismissed because he should have been sued in the case against Attorney 1. Plaintiff then sued Defendant and his law firm for failing to add a claim against Attorney 2 to the suit against Attorney 1. Defendant and his law firm added Attorney 2 and Attorney 1 to the case under a New Jersey statute providing for indemnification and contribution by those also responsible for Plaintiff's damages.

Issue:   Could the defendant attorney seek reimbursement for damages paid to the Plaintiff from the lawyers the plaintiff previously retained to try to recover its deposit?

Ruling:   In reversing the lower court, the Appellate Division held that an attorney could seek to recover from the lawyers Plaintiff previously retained to try to recover its deposit, based on the following factors:
1) The Defendants' liability and the predecessor attorney's potential liability to the plaintiff were all for failing to protect the interest of the Plaintiff.
2) All liability in the case followed from Attorney 1's potential malpractice in protecting the Plaintiff's interest in its contract with the seller.
3) Defendant was liable for failing to protect Plaintiff's claim against Attorney 2, who was potentially liable for failing to protect Plaintiff's claim against Attorney 1, who was potentially liable for failing to protect Plaintiff's interest against the seller.

Lesson:   When attorneys are sued for failing to protect the plaintiff's interest by a subsequent lawyer for that plaintiff, the attorneys remain potentially liable to the paying defendant lawyer for the extent of the damages to the plaintiff that they caused.

Editor's Note: This summary is posted for educational purposes only, as the Appellate Division decision summarized above was reversed by the NJ Supreme Court. See, 182 N.J. 64,76 (2004). (PDF)

The Supreme Court stated:

...we are dismayed by the cottage industry of litigation that was spawned by a rather commonplace real estate transaction that occurred eighteen years ago. By this opinion, we bring this matter to an end today. We, therefore, hold that, under the circumstances of this case, the prior tortfeasors are not liabile for statutory contribution to the subsequent tortfeasor because the prior and subsequent tortfeasors were not jointly or severally liable to plaintiff for the same cause of action.  We further hold that the subsequent totfeasor cannot claim statutory contribution form the prior tortfeasor inasmuch  as the "injury" inflicted by the prior  tortfeasrn is not the "same injury" as the one inlficted by the subsequent tortfeasor.