NY: Vicarious Liability: Partnership By Estoppel

 Community Capital Bank v. Fischer & Yanowitz 47 A.D.3d 667, 850 N.Y.S.2d 508
N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept., 2008

NY: Underlying Commercial Transaction

Student Contributor: Ryan O'Donnell


Facts: Plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against Fischer & Yanowitz, and Jeffery Yanowitz. Plaintiff filed a motion to join Patricia Fischer and Jeffery Yanowitz as partners based upon partnership law and the doctrine of partnership by estoppel. The Supreme Court, Kings County granted plaintiff’s motion to consolidate, and denied a motion by Yanowitz for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.

Issue: Does a partnership exist between parties who do not agree to share in the profits or losses of a business?

Ruling: A partnership did not exist between Fischer and Yanowitz, as there was no mutual promise or undertaking to share in the profits in the business or to submit to the burden of making good the losses. The doctrine of partnership by estoppel was inapplicable because Yanowitz never represented that him and Fischer were partners, there was no evidence that he consented to Fischer representing him as a partner, nor was there any indication that plaintiff relied on Fischer and Yanowitz being partners in retaining Fischer as counsel.

Lesson: If there is no written agreement between the parties, a court will look to the conduct, intention, and relationship of the parties to determine if a partnership exists. A partnership does not exist if there is no “mutual promise or undertaking of the parties to share in the profits of the business and submit to the burden of making good the losses.”

A court will impose a partnership under the doctrine of partnership by estoppel, Partnership Law §27, when


“a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, represents himself, or consents to another representing him to any one, as a partner in an existing partnership or with one or more persons not actual partners, he is liable to any such person to whom such representation has been made, who has, on the faith of such representation, given credit to the actual or apparent partnership, and if he has made such representation or consented to its being made in a public manner he is liable to such person, whether the representation has or has not been made or communicated to such person so giving credit by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner making the representation or consenting to its being made.”

 

Conflicts of Interest in Commercial Transactions: Representing Multiple Parties

Dessel v. Dessel and Donohue,431 N.W.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1988).

Iowa underlying partnership dissolution

Student contributor: Cheryl Neuman

Facts: Two brothers, James and George, were partners in a business and wanted to dissolve the partnership. Both brothers retained one lawyer, the defendant in the present action. The agreement stated that James’ share of the partnership would be sold to George and the accounts receivable would be divided equally between the two brothers.   After the partnership was dissolved, James died. James’ wife was appointed executor of the estate and she also retained defendant attorney as her attorney. James’ wife and George got into an argument regarding the division of the accounts receivable. Defendant counseled both George and James’ wife during the dispute. After the dispute could not be resolved, defendant, acting for the estate, sued George, claiming he breached his fiduciary duties in collecting the accounts receivable. George retained separate counsel and filed a legal malpractice case against defendant.

Issue 1: Was defendant liable for inserting a “hold harmless clause” in the dissolution agreement, as it was the sole basis for James’ wife’s suit against George?

Ruling 1: Yes, because this specific provision was inserted by mistake and in direct violation of the brother’s wishes and instructions. Defendant was therefore negligent.

Issue 2: Did defendant attorney have a conflict of interest in representing both George and James’ wife?

Ruling 2: Yes, because George stopped taking the 6% fee that James and George had orally agreed upon as a result of defendant’s advice. Defendant would not have given this advice had he not been retained to represent James’ wife. Furthermore, defendant’s negligence in inserting this clause, proximately caused George to pay legal expenses to defend the estate’s suit against him. Defendant’s advice to George was clearly the reason George surrendered the commission he had earned.

Lesson: A lawyer should not represent two parties in a matter when there is a clear conflict. There was information in this case that defendant questioned George about his activities and then used that information as the basis for the lawsuit against George; a clear violation of the professional rules of conduct. Rather than trying to retain the most amount of clients for the most amount of profit, it is wise to only represent those parties that are proper to represent and steer clear of malpractice litigation.