NJ Affidavit of Merit: Now Required in Legal Malpractice Claims Against a Law Firm

 Sharmrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr Harrison Harvey Bransburg & Ellers, et al (NJ App Div. 6-14-2010)

NJ underlying loss of patent due to alleged attorney negligence.

The Appellate Division has now ruled, in a case of first impression, that although New Jersey's Affidavit of Merit Statute does not list a Law Firm as a "licensed person" against whom an Affidavit of Merit is required in a legal malpractice suit, the law firm entity is to be considered a "licensed person" within the meaning of the statute. 

The facts are complex, the Judges tried to limit their holding to the unique facts of the case, but the Court's message--or at least the lesson for the practitioner seems  clear: 

1) Get an Affidavit of Merit for all defendants in a legal malpractice action in New Jersey, regardless of whether the defendant is admitted in NJ or not. 

2) Include in the Affidavit of Merit the law firm, as an entity, even though the law firm is a non-New Jersey based law firm.

The entire decision is worth reading.  Just click the case name above. 

NJ Affidavit of Merit Statute: Necessary for Recovery of Legal Fees

Morris v. Brickfield & Donahue et al. (App. Div. April 14, 2010) (Unpublished)

Facts:  Vincent Morris retained Brickfield & Donahue to represent him on a direct appeal of his conviction of second-degree usury, bail motion, and the enforcement of a forfeiture settlement.  Morris did not prevail on the bail motion or appeal.  He then filed a civil action against Brickfield & Donahue for charging unreasonable fees under the parties' retainer agreement and failure "to perform in accordance with our agreement". 

Brickfield & Donahue successfully moved to dismiss for failure to file an Affidavit of Merit.  Morris appealed and argued that his cause of action for breach of contract does not require an Affidavit of Merit.  The Appellate Divison, however, affirmed the lower court's ruling.

Issue:  Is an Affidavit of Merit necessary in an action against an attorney for reimbursement of legal fees?

Ruling:  Yes.  The Appellate Division explained that an Affidavit of Merit is necessary because:

[T]he underlying allegations require proof of a deviation from a professional standard of care.  In order to establish that defendants charged him an unreasonable fee, plaintiff requires expert testimony.

Notably, Morris, a Pro Se Plaintiff, supplied the Court with a letter opinion from an attorney to the effect that the brief filed on the direct appeal should not have taken more than ten to fifteen hours to prepare, and that Brickfield & Donahue should have raised an ineffective assistance of counsel issue on direct appeal, not as a part of post-conviction relief.  The Appellate Division, however, held that the letter did not satisfy the form or substance of the New Jersey Affidavit of Merit Statute, since it was not an Affidavit and did not contain an opinion to the effect that there was a "reasonable probability of professional negligence". 

Further, the Court refused to grant Morris' a 60 day extension to file the requisite Affidavit of Merit:

That extension...requires a showing of good cause...Self-representation is not the equivalent of good cause...Plaintiff's ignorance of the law, if that is what occurred here, is neither an excuse for the omission nor good cause for an extension of time in which to comply with the statute.

Lesson:  An Affidavit of Merit is necessary even where Plaintiff seeks only reimbursement of legal fees under a breach of contract theory.  A Pro Se Plaintiff's ignorance of the law will not lead to an extension of the time within which the Affidavit of Merit must be supplied.

NJ When Does Legal Malpractice "Occur" under the Affidavit of Merit Statute?

Christie v. Jeney, 167 N.J. 509 (2001)

Student Contributor: Daniel Schick

NJ Underlying Civil/Commercial Litigation

Facts: Christie retained Jeney to pursue three claims on his behalf. Christie then alleged that in the course of the representation, Jeney failed to answer discovery requests in a contract claim, failed to properly serve and plead a civil-rights claim, and negligently allowed the statute of limitations to run on a defamation claim.

Plaintiff subsequently retained new counsel (Lucas) and filed a three-count malpractice complaint against Jeney. Jeney answered the complaint and demanded that Christie serve an affidavit of merit pursuant to the New Jersey Affidavit of Merit statute (“AMS”). Upon Plaintiff’s failure to do so, Jeney moved to dismiss the action for failing to satisfy the AMS. Christie then submitted the requisite Affidavit of Merit. Since dimissals under the AMS were without prejudice, and Christie could simply re-file the malpractice action, the Law Division denied Jeney's motion to dismiss, despite the fact that Christie’s Affidavit of Merit had not been submitted within the time limits set forth under the AMS.

Thereafter, the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed a portion of Alan J. Cornblatt, P.A. v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218 (1998), an earlier case, holding that dismissals under the AMS were to be with prejudice. In light of this decision, Jeney moved for reconsideration. The Law Division concluded that Christie's claims against Jeney accrued after the effective date of the AMS, and therefore, Christie's failure to provide a timely affidavit of merit required dismissal of the claims with prejudice.

Christie then filed a second amended complaint adding Lucas as a defendant, alleging that Lucas negligently failed to provide an affidavit of merit, leading to the dismissal of the action against Jeney. Lucas challenged the Law Division order dismissing Christie's complaint against Jeney. The Law Division denied the motion and the Appellate Division denied leave to appeal. The Supreme Court granted Certification.

Issue: How do you determine whether a legal malpractice action is or is not subject to the requirements of the AMS?

Ruling: The critical inquiry under the AMS is whether the actual conduct underlying the legal malpractice claim took place before the effective date of the statute (June 29, 1995). As the Law Division recognized, the allegations of malpractice against Jeney almost entirely referenced his conduct prior to June 29, 1995. Therefore, the AMS did not apply to Christie's claims against Jeney. The lower court’s holding was reversed and the action was remanded for further proceedings.

Lesson: The AMS became effective June 29, 1995, and explicitly states that it would apply to causes of action which “occur” on or after that date. Accordingly, the statute applies only to cases where the acts constituting the alleged malpractice took place on or after the effective date of the statute. The “filing” date of the malpractice action is irrelevant.