FRCP Rule 11 Liability for Lawyers

Hays v. Sony Corp. of America, 847 F. 2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988)

Underlying copyright dispute

Student Contributor: Clem Durham

Facts: The plaintiffs, Stephanie Hays and Gail MacDonald, teach business courses at a public high school in Des Plaines, Illinois. In 1982 or 1983 they prepared a manual for their students on how to operate the school's DEC word processors, and distributed copies to students and to other faculty members. In 1984 the school district, having bought word processors from Sony Corporation of America, gave Sony the plaintiffs' manual and asked Sony to modify it so that it could be used with Sony's word processors. Sony proceeded to do so, resulting in a manual very similar to — in many places a verbatim copy of — the plaintiff's manual. In February 1985 the plaintiffs, presumably spurred by knowledge of Sony's manual, registered their own manual with the Copyright Office, and in July they filed this lawsuit in federal district court. Sony filed several motions for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking reimbursement of some $47,000 in attorney's fees and related expenses, and the district judge had heard, but not decided, the motions several days before he dismissed the action. Several months later, on February 18, 1987, the judge awarded Sony $14,895.46 in sanctions against the plaintiffs' counsel, Emmanuel F. Guyon, but not against the plaintiffs. Guyon appealed.

Issue: Is an award of sanctions permissible, under FRCP Rule 11, against an attorney for filing a complaint that is not frivolous but was ineffectively pursued?

Ruling: Yes. In the Rule 11 setting the victims are the lawyer's adversary, other litigants in the court's queue, and the court itself. By asserting claims without first inquiring whether they have a plausible grounding in law and fact, a lawyer can impose on an adversary and on the judicial system substantial costs that would have been — and should have been — avoided by a reasonable prepleading inquiry.

Lesson: The Rule 11 standard, like the negligence standard in tort law, is an objective standard. Therefore, one must know the law before bringing claims, even if one is not an expert in the field. Otherwise, a lawyer may get sanctioned.  

MI: SOL Runs on day Power of Atty is Revoked in Malpractice Suit

Wright v. Rinaldo, 279 Mich App 526, 533 n 3; 761 NW2d 114 (2008)

MI: Underlying IP

Student Contributor: Matthew Feinbloom


Facts: In August 2000, Mr. Rickie Wright hired  Ronildo as his attorney in a patent case against the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Three years after hiring Ronildo, Wright was unsatisfied with her work. Wright met with other patent attorneys and on December 18th, 2003 Wright signed a document that revoked Ronildo’s power of attorney. At this time Wright also signed the power of attorney over to another lawyer who then took over the case. Wright also instructed the Patent Office that all correspondence was to go through his new counsel. After key errors were made in the pursuit of this patent, Wright filed a legal malpractice suit against Ronildo on February 16, 2006. The lower court granted summary judgment for Ronildo holding that the attorney/client relationship ended on December 18th, 2003 thereby barring Wright’s action due to the two-year statute of limitations.

Issue: Does the attorney/client relationship end once the client revokes the power of attorney, hires new counsel and reassigns the power of attorney?

Ruling: Yes. Under Michigan law it does not have to be the court that effectively terminates the attorney/client relationship. If Wright had truly wanted Ronildo to stay on as co-counsel there would be no need to revoke her power of attorney. This revocation, along with the hiring and transfer of power of attorney to a new lawyer affirmatively communicated to Ronildo that she had been replaced and the attorney/client relationship had ended. Under MI law, “The client's action for malpractice is time-barred unless it is brought within two years from the date the claim accrued or arose (i.e., the date that services were discontinued), or within six months of the date that "the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever date occurs later.” MCL 600.5805(6); MCL 600.5838(2); Kloian v. Schwartz, 272 Mich. App. 232, 237, 725 N.W.2d 671 (2006). Therefore Ronildo’s motion for summary disposition was properly granted because two years had passed since the claim arose.

Lesson: Revoking the power of attorney, hiring a new lawyer, and giving that new counsel power of attorney is enough to terminate the attorney/client relationship. Once this relationship is over the statute of limitations begins to run on the amount of time the client is permitted to sue for malpractice.

 

MI: Statutes of Limitations in underlying IP cases

Wright v. Rinaldo, 279 Mich App 526; 761 NW2d 114 (2008)

Underlying patent prosecution USPTO

Student Contributor: Matthew Feinbloom


Facts: In August 2000,  Wright hired  Ronildo as his attorney in a patent case before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Three years after hiring Ronildo, Wright was dissatisfied with her work. Wright met with other patent attorneys and on December 18th, 2003 Wright signed a document that revoked Ronildo’s power of attorney before the USPTO. At this time Wright also signed the power of attorney over to another lawyer who then took over the case. Wright also instructed the Patient Office that all correspondence was to go through his new counsel. After key errors were made in the pursuit of this patent, Wright filed a legal malpractice suit against Ronildo on February 16, 2006. The lower court granted summary disposition for Ronildo holding that the attorney/client relationship ended on December 18th, 2003 thereby barring Wright’s action due to the two-year statute of limitations.

Issue: Does the attorney/client relationship end once the client revokes the power of attorney, hires new counsel and reassigns the power of attorney?

Ruling: Yes. Under Michigan law it does not have to be the court that effectively terminates the attorney/client relationship. If Wright had truly wanted Ronildo to stay on as co-counsel there would be no need to revoke her power of attorney. This revocation, along with the hiring and transfer of power of attorney to a new lawyer affirmatively communicated to Ronildo that she had been replaced and the attorney/client relationship had ended. Under MI law, “The client's action for malpractice is time-barred unless it is brought within two years from the date the claim accrued or arose (i.e., the date that services were discontinued), or within six months of the date that "the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever date occurs later.” MCL 600.5805(6); MCL 600.5838(2); Kloian v. Schwartz, 272 Mich. App. 232, 237, 725 N.W.2d 671 (2006). Therefore Ronildo’s motion for summary disposition was properly granted because two years had passed since the claim arose.

Lesson: Revoking the power of attorney, hiring a new lawyer, and giving that new counsel power of attorney is enough to terminate the attorney/client relationship. Once this relationship is over the statute of limitations begins to run on the amount of time the client is permitted to sue for malpractice.

Third Circuit: Violation of RPC 1.7 Does Not Require Automatic Disqualification

Wyeth v. Abbott Laboratories, 692 F.Supp.2d 453 (D.N.J. 2010)

Facts:  Wyeth brought a motion to disqualify Howrey LLP from representing Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. ("BSC") in an underlying patent infringement action.  Wyeth alleged that it was a conflict of interest for Howrey to represent BSC against Wyeth in the underlying action, while representing Wyeth in a separate, ongoing patent matter in Europe.  More specifically, Wyeth contended that Howrey's conduct was in violation of RPC 1.7(a)(1).  

The Court held that Howrey's conduct was in violation of RPC 1.7 and disqualified Howrey, interpreting applicable case law as requiring mandatory disqualification for a violation of RPC 1.7. Howrey appealed.

Issue:  Can a law firm represent an adversary of a current client in another, unrelated matter? 

Ruling:  Perhaps. 

The Court first determined that BSC, a defendant in the underlying patent litigation, and Wyeth, a plaintiff in that litigation, were adversaries, and that Howrey was representing Wyeth in the separate European patent matter, thus creating a current attorney-client relationship between Wyeth and Howrey.  

RPC 1.7(a)(1) provides that a concurrent conflict of interest exists if the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client. Accordingly, the Court then moved on to the question of whether a violation of RPC 1.7 requires disqualification.  In making this determination, the Court stated:

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that "[a]lthough disqualification ordinarily is the result of a finding that a disciplinary rule prohibits an attorney's appearance in a case, disqualification never is automatic." U.S. v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir.1980). The question of whether disqualification is appropriate is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, which "means that the court should disqualify an attorney only when it determines, on the facts of the particular case, that disqualification is an appropriate means of enforcing the applicable disciplinary rule." Id.

The Court then set forth twelve factors to be considered in determining whether disqualification was warranted: 

(1) prejudice to Wyeth; (2) prejudice to BSC; (3) whether's Howrey's representation of Wyeth in the [European] matter allowed BSC access to any confidential information relevant to this case; (4) the cost—in terms of both time and money—for BSC to retain new counsel; (5) the complexity of the issues in the case and the time it would take new counsel to acquaint themselves with the facts and issues; (6) which party, if either, was responsible for creating the conflict; [7] whether the two matters at issue are related in substance; [8] whether both matters are presently active; [9] whether any attorneys from the firm have been involved in both matters; [10] whether the matters are each being handled from offices in different geographic locations; [11] whether the attorneys from the law firm work with different client representative[s] for each matter; and [12] the relative time billed by the law firm to each matter.

Ultimately, the Court found that there was no evidence that Howrey's independent professional judgment would be impaired if it was permitted to continue as counsel for BSC, since the matters were completely unrelated and no Howrey attorneys overlapped on the two matters.  Additionally, Howrey had put up an "ethical wall" with regard to the attorneys working on the matters, as well as the confidential information with regard to each matter.  With regard to prejudice to each party, the Court noted: 

Given Howrey's historical representation and the complex technologies at issue in this case, depriving BSC of its counsel of choice deprives BSC of Howrey's depth of experience and expertise. Additionally, if BSC were required to obtain new counsel, there would likely be some delay in this litigation as well as certain additional costs incurred by BSC while new counsel familiarized itself with this case. In contrast, Wyeth has not identified any prejudice that it will suffer if Howrey is not disqualified from this matter.

Consequently, the Court allowed Howrey to continue as counsel for BSC in the underlying patent litigation. 

Lesson:  Whether or not a law firm will be disqualified for a concurrent conflict of interest under RPC 1.7 is a fact sensitive determination.  It will depend on, among other factors, the remoteness of the two matters at issue, the existence of an ethical wall, the historical relationship between the law firm and the two clients, and potential prejudice to either party.

TX: Legal Malpractice Actions Don't "Arise Under" Federal Law

Roof Technical Services, Inc. v. Hill, 679 F.Supp.2d 749 (N.D.Texas 2010)

Underlying Patent/Trademark Matter

Facts:  Plaintiff invented a roof venting technique and retained Defendant Hill to secure patent protection.  In the instant action, Plaintiff alleged that it was unable to obtain patent protection due, in part, to Defendant's failure to timely submit a conforming application to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.  Based on that allegation, Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court, Northern District of Texas.  Since there was no diversity of citizenship, the Court examined whether the action "arose under" federal patent law to establish jurisdiction.

Issue:  Can a legal malpractice action based on underlying patent law issues be brought in federal court? 

Ruling:  Not where a determination of the professional negligence action requires only application of federal law. 

Plaintiff argued that it properly brought the malpractice action in federal court, since a determination would require the Court to (1) analyze whether its invention was patentable under federal law; (2) the standard of care against which Defendant's conduct would be measured requires reference to patent regulations and guidelines; and (3) the determination of damages requires a valuation of the allegedly lost patent. 

The Court, however, found Plaintiff's argument to be unpersuasive and held that the action was "traditionally" a state case.  The Court found that federal jurisdiction would be inappropriate, since there was, apparently, no need to "determine the meaning of federal patent law".  Rather, the issues raised required "only application of federal law to the specific facts of the case". 

Furthermore, the Court explained that while "there is a federal interest in the uniform application of patent laws...that interest is not implicated here, where no patent rights are actually at stake."

No patent has issued for [Plaintiff's] invention and none will issue.  Thus, even if the Court must decided patent law issues, those decisions will not create or destroy any patent rights such that uniformity in the way patents are issued or enforced will be threatened.  In other words, the determinations that might occur in this action do not justify resort to the experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers on federal issues.

***

Boiled down, this action is about Defendant's [alleged] failure to meet deadlines and communicate with their clients.  Patent issues are merely floating on the periphery.  Thus, this action does not belong in federal court.

Lesson:  Actions that require only the application of federal law to make a determination with regard to plaintiff's legal malpractice claims, do not sufficiently "arise under" federal law for purposes of establishing federal jurisdiction.

NY: Novel Theories, Out-of-State Law and the Standard of Care

Darby & Darby, P.C. v. VSI International, Inc. 95 N.Y.2d 308 (2000)

NY Underlying insurance coverage

Student Contributor: Maninder (Meena) Saini

Facts: Defendant (VSI International Inc.), a Florida corporation retained plaintiff (Darby & Darby) a New York law firm to represent it in two Florida lawsuits. Even though defendant paid a portion of a substantial legal bill, the defendant still owed nearly $200,000 in outstanding legal fees. Plaintiff moved to withdraw as counsel because the defendants did not pay them. The plaintiff was relieved as counsel in October 1993. In August 1996, plaintiff commenced an action to recover the outstanding amount in legal fees, plus interest and incidental costs. The defendant then asserted a counterclaim, alleging the plaintiff committed legal malpractice and breached a fiduciary duty by failing to advise defendant that its then-existing general liability insurance policy could have covered defendant’s litigation expenses.

Issue: Does a NY law firm specializing in patent litigation,  retained to defend a corporate client in a Florida patent infringment action have a duty to advise the client about possible insurance coverage to cover the cost of litigation?

Ruling:

 ...attorneys should familiarize themselves with current legal developments so that they can make informed judgments and effectivey counsel their clients... However, [the law firm] should not be held liable for failing to advise [the client] about a novel and questionable theory pertaining to their insurance coverage.

In a legal  malpractice action, a party must demonstrate that an attorney failed to employ “the ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession”. What is reasonable skill and knowledge is to be determined at the time of representation.

Lesson: The standard of reasonable care applicable even to specialist-attorneys does not require attorneys to comply with   novel and questionable theories of law. An attorney only has a duty to represent a client in a manner that is reasonable and consistent with the law, as it existed at the time of representation.

Assigning Your Legal Malpractice Claims: "Hidden Treasure" in Tough Times ?

Hedlund Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Weiser, Stapler & Spivak, et ano.
517 Pa. 522, 539 A.2d 357 (1988)


Facts:
Martin hired attorney Spivak to apply for a patent for a machine that Martin had invented and manufactured. Spivak prepared the application but he did not timely file it. Hedlund Manufacturing purchased Martin's business, including the rights to all pending patents. When Hedlund learned that Spivak had filed the patent application late, they had Martin assign to them all rights and causes of actions arising out of the lawyer's malpractice. Hedlund then sued Martin's lawyer for legal malpractice alleging negligence and breach of contract.

Issue: Can Hedlund (the assingee) sue the assignor's lawyer based on the assignment of the legal malpractice claim, even though there is no attorney-client relationship between the assignor and the lawyer?

Ruling: The PennsylvaniaSupreme Court said yes, reversing the lower court that had held that lack of privity barred the malpractice suit. The Court held legal malpractice claims can effectively be assigned and that "privity is not an issue involving an assigned claim because the assignee stands in the shoes of the assignor and does not pursue the cause of action in the assignee's own right." Thus, the assignment of a cause of action for legal malpractice is valid and can be used by the assignor to circumvent the privity defense. It might also be viewed as a "hidden" asset in the sale of a business.

New York: Assignment of legal malpractice claims are permitted. See, Tawil v. Finkelstein, et al 646 NYS2d 691 (App Div. 1st Dept, 1996). But they probably have to be explicit and unambiguous CALPERS v. Shearman & Steling, 95 N.Y. 2d 427 (2000).

New Jersey: Assignment of legal malpractice are not permitted for public policy reasons. Alcman Services Corp. v. Bullock 925 F. Supp. 252 (DNJ 1996).