NJ: Mandatory Legal Malpractice Insurance: The Time Has Come.

Insight and Commentary from Ben Wasserman and Krishna Shah

In order to drive a car in New Jersey, you need a license and insurance. If your negligent driving injures someone, you have insurance not only to protect yourself, but to protect the person you injure.

In order to practice law in New Jersey, you also need a license, but not insurance. If your negligence dmages a client and you have no insurance, then it's too bad for the client.

Is there something wrong with this picture? We think so. We lawyers are fiduciaries to our clients. That means that first and foremost we have to put our clients' interests ahead of our own. Even at our own cost.

Is New Jersey destined for universal mandatory legal malpractice insurance?

Read more from this week's New Jersey Law Journal's Professional Malpractice Supplement.

 

The article linked to this post may express the opinions of its authors. It is not intended as a statement or position of the editorial board of The Legal Malpractice Law Review.

Studying Legal Malpractice and Learning How to Bounce Back

Congratulations to Professor Bennett J. Wasserman and his Hofstra Law Students on launching the Legal Malpractice Law Review. This e-journal provides meaningful guidance on legal malpractice developments and prevention.


In writing Legal Malpractice Law: Problems and Prevention, Professor Vincent  Johnson and I wanted to give law students a practical guide for studying legal malpractice issues. Our hope is that the text helps students understand the  anatomy of a legal malpractice case, common malpractice traps, and steps that lawyers can take to protect clients, while reducing legal malpractice  exposure. In that spirit, I am very pleased to see how Hofstra Law students have  moved forward in publishing summaries of recent cases with insightful lessons.

The study of legal malpractice cases and commentaries reveals that all lawyers  are subject to being sued for malpractice. Good lawyers as well as "not so  good" lawyers get sued. What distinguishes lawyers is how they handle  challenges to their own conduct, including legal malpractice claims.
Psychologists who have studied emotional intelligence, report that lawyers as a
group are less resilient than most other professionals. The good news is that  resilience can be learned. See, "The Bounce-Back Factor", ABA Journal, April 2003  at 66.

To start a discussion thread on how lawyers handle their own errors, I invite  comments on how law schools help students develop resilience. What are law  schools currently doing and what steps can law schools take to prepare future  lawyers to handle mistakes and challenges to their conduct?

I look forward to your observations and suggestions.

Editor's Note: Practicing lawyers are  encouraged to join the discussion by posting their own inisghts and comments. Just click the "Comments" icon below.

Bouncing Back After Malpractice

The Editorial Board of the

Legal Malpractice Law Review

      is pleased to invite you to an online discussion starting on

Monday morning November  16, 2009

   led by:

Professor Susan Saab Fortney

   Paul Whitfield Horn Professor of Law
       T
exas Tech University School of Law

on

"Bouncing Back After Malpractice"

 

Professor Fortney is on the Board of Contributors of the Legal Malpractice Law Review and is a renowned expert in the field. She is co-author with Professor Vincent Johnson of

LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION (Thomson-West, 2008) 

 We look forward to your joining us in this fascinating and  timely discussion. Please share your Comments directly to Professor Fortney's  blog post, which will appear right above this invitation.

The Hidden Issue in Akin Gump v NDR

The Texas Supreme Court’s new opinion (October 30, 2009) in Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. National Development and Research Corporation  holds that

  1. “collectibility” must be determined no earlier than the time of the underlying judgment, and
  2. “a malpractice plaintiff may recover damages for attorney’s fees paid in the underlying case to the extent the fees were proximately caused by the defendant attorney’s negligence.”

The first holding seems non-controversial, whereas the second may or may not open Pandora’s box (more on that in a separate comment posted immediately below this one).  Yet there is another consequence of the Akin Gump decision – hidden and significant – that reporters and commentators may have missed.

Because the holding on the first two issues required reversal, the Texas Supreme Court declined to review the lower court’s ruling regarding contingent fee offsets. The contingent fee offset issue is simple: If a lawyer’s malpractice results in the loss of a collectible judgment of $1,000, but the client had a 40% contingent fee agreement with the lawyer, is the client entitled to recover $1,000 or $600? If one applies a pure “but for” causation analysis the answer should be $600, because even if the case had been handled perfectly, the client would only have netted $600. Yet, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the client’s damages are not to be offset by the amount of the lawyer’s contingent fee. Because the Supreme Court declined to review this issue, the Dallas Court’s ruling remains the law.

The Dallas Court observed:

Akin Gump was entitled to its contingency fee only if NDR prevailed in the [underlying] Panda lawsuit. Due to Akin Gump's negligence, NDR did not prevail and thus Akin Gump did not earn its contingency fee. To give the firm a credit for a contingency fee it failed to earn would be to reward its wrongdoing.

Is this logical? Does it conform the Texas Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of the “but for” standard for causation in Akin Gump? Are there any other reasons to disregard a lawyer’s contingent fee interest in determining the amount of damages?

The Dallas Court also held:

To secure the damages it would have been awarded in the Panda lawsuit, NDR was required to pay two sets of lawyers and endure the aggravation of a second lawsuit and a second appeal. The attorney's fees and expenses incurred to prosecute a legal malpractice suit are not recoverable as damages, absent some statute or agreement not applicable here. Simply put, NDR must pay attorneys twice to be in the same position it would have been in absent Akin Gump's malpractice. It should not be forced to “pay” a contingency fee that Akin Gump never earned. (citation omitted).

Does the Texas Supreme Court’s new ruling that attorneys’ fees may be recovered as damages remove the logical underpinning for the Dallas Court’s ruling on the contingent fee offset?

Akin Gump v NDR - Practical Consequences of Allowing Attorneys' Fees as Damages

The Texas Supreme Court’s new opinion in Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. National Development and Research Corporation holds that

a malpractice plaintiff may recover damages for attorney’s fees paid in the underlying case to the extent the fees were proximately caused by the defendant attorney’s negligence.

Prior to this holding, Texas courts had generally disfavored the recovery of attorneys’ fees qua damages unless allowed by statute or contract.


At first glance, the Akin Gump Court’s holding appears straightforward and logical, and in some cases will be easy to implement. For example, if a lawyer fails to file an answer, resulting in a default judgment, the plaintiff should be able to recover the fees it must pay a second attorney to have the default set aside. In this example, 100% of the extra fees are attributable to cleaning up the first lawyer’s mistake. Most cases, however, are not so cut and dried. 

I fear several unintended consequences from the Court’s ruling: 

  • First, will there be a new class of cases in which there are no damages but attorneys fees? For example, if a lawyer obtains a total victory for the client, will the client (perhaps hoping to bargain for a fee reduction) comb the record for inconsequential errors that nevertheless may have increased the total fee by some amount?
  • Second, will the new rule be used to avoid summary judgment in cases in which the undisputed facts prove the negligence caused no damages? Take appellate malpractice. If a trial court decides as a matter of law that the client would have lost the appeal regardless of the malpractice, will the client’s claim now survive based on a “fact issue” regarding increased appellate costs due to the negligence?
  • Third, how much will the rule expand the number and costs of mandatory expert witnesses? Expert testimony is needed to prove causation in all but the most obvious situations. Alexander v. Turtur & Assocs., Inc., 146 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2004).(PDF) Doesn’t this mean a new set of experts will be needed in every malpractice case in which the plaintiff seeks attorneys’ fees as damages? The experts will need to review the record and opine whether the malpractice proximately caused an increase in attorneys’ fees and, if so, how much.

Question: Does Akin Gump open Pandora’s box or is it simply a logical extension of “but for” causation? Are there any special rules or limits that should apply?

Welcome to the Legal Malpractice Law Review

The purpose of the Legal Malpractice Law Review is very simple: To help make us all better lawyers.

Today, we lawyers are expected to adhere to  the highest levels of competence, diligence and honesty at the risk of being held accountable for substantial  money damages to clients and non-clients.    Our  law schools teach and test us on professional responsibility, i.e., legal ethics.  But very few  offer us a course in professional liability, i.e., legal malpractice. The two fields are distinct, yet both are essential for us if we are expected to deliver  high quality legal services. Just as  we  need to know about professional responsibility, we must also know about professional liability; and how to avoid it.

We're all busy lawyers. But now, through the simplicity and convenience of blog technology, Legal Malpractice Law Review allows us to quickly learn —through its one-minute case summaries, about the professional mistakes other lawyers have made.  We will also see how to avoid those mistakes and thus spare ourselves  from the  catastrophic risks of malpractice; not to mention how to protect our own clients from the harm they will  suffer from such mistakes. Over the years, we plan to build an on-line  archive of one-minute-case summaries for as many past and current court decisions we can find that touch on the substantive area of legal malpractice. In addition, we plan to post important resource materials such as standards, Restatement sections and Rules that pertain to legal malpractice.  We will also be able to participate in blog discussions on timely topics conducted  by well-known practitioners, insurance industry professionals, law school faculty and experts in the field.

I am so grateful to many who have made the Legal Malpractice Law Review a reality:  First, my Lawyer Malpractice students at Hofstra Law School, whose required research and writing assignments  provide most of the content for the one-minute-case summaries appearing in this blog. Since 1990, each of my students has inspired me to continue  to study, work in  and help to build this new substantive area of the law. The President, Dean and Law School faculty at Hofstra have served as a constant source of support to me, encouraging originality, innovation and practice-based relevance in legal education. The many lawyers and law firms-- from both the defense and plaintiff's bar,  throughout the country,  who have given me the privilege to serve as their legal malpractice and ethics consultant and expert witness in over 1000 fascinating cases. The many clients--from widows and orphans to publicly traded corporations and prominent law firms, who have entrusted me with representing their respective interests in legal malpractice cases for over  three decades. They all have provided me with a  continuing and generous supply of educational resources. And finally, to my wife and  partner in life  for the past 40+ years-- whose beauty, loyalty and pragmatism have given me nothing less than the world, and more.

It is my sincere hope that all members of the legal community will gain from this effort and that it will ultimately find its appropriate place in the ongoing quest to make us all better lawyers for the benefit of those who depend on our counsel.  

                                                                      Bennett J. Wasserman
                                                                      Editor

Breach of Fiduciary Duty in Legal Malpractice: Yea or Nay?

During one of our recent class meetings at Hofstra Law School, we discussed the different causes of action that are typically brought in legal malpractice lawsuits. We saw in Fiorentino v. Rapoport, 693 A.2d 208 (PA. 1997), at least three separate and distinct causes of action: breach of contract, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Many jurisdictions apply different statutes of limitations to each of these causes of action, which frequently determine which one of them will survive a motion to dismiss. Sometimes the facts of a particular case can establish theories of liability in more than one cause of action. For example, the same facts can establish both negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

One renowned scholar, Professor Charles Wolfram, is critical of the way courts have permitted breach of fiduciary duty claims in legal malpractice cases. He wants them to be scaled back. In “A Cautionary Tale: Fiduciary Breach as Legal Malpractice”, 34 Hofstra L. Rev. 689,692 (2006), he argues that

“courts have allowed fiduciary breach claims to proliferate needlessly on the same ground already adequately occupied by negligence….[M]ost fiduciary breach claims are problematic precisely because of their almost complete and useless overlap with available claims of negligence.”

On the other hand, we studied Judge (now Justice) Sotomayor’s decision in Estate of Re v. Kornstein, et al., 958 F. Supp. 907 (SDNY 1997). She points out that a breach of fiduciary duty claim alleviates plaintiff's burden of proof particularly in regard to the proximate cause element of the cause of action. (True, the Court dismissed the negligence claim and permitted the fiduciary breach to proceed.) Also, there is generally a longer statute of limitations applicable to breach of fiduciary duty claims than negligence claims. These distinctions can easily make the difference between recovery for or dismissal of a bona fide claim. The notion that meritorious claims deserve appropriate remedies may thus help to explain why the vitality of the fiduciary breach claim is so important to fundamental fairness and justice.

We also read the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers § 49 which provides that the breach of fiduciary duty claim is “[i]n addition to the other possible bases of civil liability…”

Should fiduciary breach claims in legal malpractice lawsuits be permitted to continue to flourish or should they be scaled back and limited to being, in effect, a cause of action of last resort reserved only for the most reprehensible forms of lawyer misconduct that harms clients? And what if it harms forseeable non-clients?

Do you see any merit to the argument that the proliferation of fiduciary breach claims should be encouraged because of its prophylactic benefit, i.e., it serves as a constant reminder to us of our over-arching, primary duty of undivided loyalty to our client and thus encourages adherence to that duty?

As lawyers, these are concepts we must take to heart in our everyday dealings with clients and non-clients alike. What do you think about this debate? Do you see a lawyer’s fiduciary duty as a standard of care or perhaps even an enforceable “Code of Conduct”? Or do you think in years to come we will see a move toward taking the teeth out of its bite?

Please, share your thoughts and comments with us. Just click the comments link below.

Prof. W.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Legal Malpractice reaches the High Court

Padilla v. Kentucky, Argued before the US Supreme Court Oct. 13, 2009 (PDF)

Does a lawyer's wrong advice to a client, a permanent resident alien, to plead guilty to a criminal charge that results in his deportation, amount to  ineffective assistance of counsel?

The High Court heard oral argument today. Stay tuned. Read the argument of the parties and the grilling of the Justices.

Smith v. Spisak. Argued before the US Supreme Court on Oct. 13, 2009 (PDF)

How bad does defense counsel's summation have to be before it amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel?  The High Court heard oral argument today  on this too.