NV: Dismissal for Double Recovery

Elyousef v. O'Reilly & Ferrario, LLC, Supreme Court of Nevada, November 18, 2010

Facts:  Homayouni entered into a transaction with his law firm's client, Elyousef, to acquire interest in Nevada Oil and Land Development ("NOLD").  Perceiving this as a conflict of interest, Homayouni's firm opposed the transaction.  Homayouni left the firm to complete the transaction. 

When the business relationship soured, however, Homayouni sued Elyousef.  Elyousef counterclaimed and was awarded upwards of $375,000.  Eventually, however, he settled for $50,000, plus the return of his interest in NOLD.  After settling with Homayouni, Elyousef brought a number of claims against Homayouni's former firm, including legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.  The trial court held that Elyousef's claims were barred by the doctrine of double recovery and issue preclusion. 

Issue:  Was Elyousef barred from pursuing claims against the law firm after entering into a settlement with Homayouni? 

Ruling:  Yes. 

The Court first noted that "under the double recovery doctrine, "there can be only one recovery of damages for one wrong or injury...Thus, [a] plaintiff may not recover damages twice for the same injury simply because he or she has two legal theories."  

Valuing Elyousef's interest in NOLD at $2 million, the Court held that Elyousef had fully satisfied his judgment against Homayouni and could not now proceed for a double recovery against the O'Reilly firm.  The Court noted that "settlement prevents further recovery from another party for the same injury when the total amount of damages is established before settlement and the settlement fully satisfies those damages."  The Court did not address application of the doctrine where a party chooses to, voluntarily and knowingly, enter into a settlement for less than the value of his judgment. 

The Court further ruled that Elyousef was barred from re-litigating his damages as a result of Homayouni's conduct in a new suit against the O'Reilly firm, since the issue had been fully litigated and decided on the merits in the first litigation. 

Lesson:  The double recovery doctrine will be applied where a party seeks recovery under a legal malpractice theory after entering into a settlement that fully satisfies damages awarded in a separate litigation for the same injury.  

WI: Payment Under Legal Mal Policy "Triggers" Under Insured Coverage

Degenhardt-Wallace v. Hoskins, Kalnins, McNamara & Day 689 N.W.2d 911 (Wis. App. 2004)

WI: Underlying insurance suit: How to contstrue policy language

Student Contributor: Jeff Cain

Facts: Client is involved in a car accident, and retains lawyer. The defendant  driver in the  other car  has a bodily injury liability limit of $50,000. Client’s policy had an underinsured motorist policy with $100,000 limit. Lawyer fails to file suit before the statute of limitations expires. Client sues lawyer for legal malpractice. The lawyer argued that he should not be liable for more than $50,000, since any amount greater than that would be covered by the client’s underinsured motorist policy. The insurance company, who was the carrier for both drivers in the accident, argued that they did not need to pay the client any amount, because the insurance policy said that there is no coverage until the full amount of the bodily injury insurance has been used up, and no insurance had been used in this case due to the lawyer's malpractice in blowing the  statute of limitations.

Issue: Does a lawyer who commits legal malpractice by blowing  the statute of limitations owe the full amount of insurance that the client would have received from both the defendant driver and the client's own underinsured coverage  or only the amount that the lawyer would have recovered  from the underlying defendant driver, if he had successfully filed suit against the offending driver?

Ruling: The lawyer is only liable for the amount that he would have won if he had filed suit against the offending driver. But the under insured carrier is not off the hook. It still owes the client the proceeds of its underinsured coverage even though the liability payment was made by the legal malpractice carrier, instead of driver's carrier. (PS: The liability carrier and the underinsured carrier were the same company).

Lesson: Legal malpractice insurer's payment of what would have been paid by a defendant driver's insurer but for  the  lawyer's blowing the statute of limitations in an auto injury case "triggers" the required payment necessary to collect benefits under a first party underinsurance policy. 
 

 

FROM THE ENTIRE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE 

LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW REVIEW

 

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November 25, 2010

 

 

 

MD: "Case within a Case," the Golden Test for Proximate Cause

Suder v. Whiteford, Taylor & Peston, LLP, Court of Appeals of Maryland, April 9, 2010. 

Facts:  Suder filed an action for legal malpractice against her former attorneys, alleging failure to timely file a request for a fifth extension which, ostensibly, caused her to receive approximately $270,000 less under a will than she otherwise would have.  The defendant attorneys admitted that they failed to timely request an extension, but argued that that omission was not the cause of Suder's alleged damages.  

The defendant attorneys argued that even if they had timely filed a request for a fifth extension, Suder would not have collected her statutory share because of the invalidity of her original request for extension at which time she was not represented by the defendant attorneys.  Accordingly, the attorneys contended that their "mistake" did not place Suder in a worse position, and that Suder could not prove proximate cause under the "case within a case" doctrine. 

Suder argued that the "case within a case" doctrine constitutes a "hypothetical...rewrite of history," and even if it is to be used, the defendant attorneys must be limited by the underlying defendants' waiver of their right to challenge a previous extension. 

Issue:  Must Plaintiff establish proximate cause by proving the underlying case in the malpractice case?  If so, are the former attorneys limited to only those defenses previously raised by the underlying adversary?

Ruling:  Suder must show proximate cause under the "case within a case" doctrine.  The defendant attorneys were not limited to only those defenses raised previously by Suder's adversary in the underlying action. 

The trial-within-a-trial doctrine is "the accepted and traditional means of resolving issues involved in the underlying proceeding in a legal malpractice action. It should be applied where there is no bright line malpractice... The trial-within-a-trial doctrine exposes "what the result `should have been' or what the result `would have been'" had the lawyer's negligence not occurred.

Accordingly, the Court held that the "case within a case" method was the appropriate way to determine whether Suder's adversary in the underlying litigation would have successfully challenged her requests for extensions, had the defendant attorney timely requested a fifth extension.  In that regard, the Court noted that Suder's adversary in the underlying litigation was permitted to challenge the validity of any extension throughout the appellate process, up until close of the estate administration.  

Moreover, the Court noted that the defendant attorneys were limited to those defenses Suder's adversary "would have" raised in the underlying action upon the filing of a fifth extension, rather than only those defense that had been raised previously:

Here, [the defendant attorneys are] given the chance to present the defense as merely the knife that severs the causal link between its own negligence and Suder's damages in this malpractice action. Relitigating the underlying action for the purposes of a malpractice suit is simply a tool by which the litigants are able to wind back the clock to determine whether the attorney proximately caused the injury.

To ascertain what defenses Suder's adversary would have raised with regard to a fifth extension, "the trier of fact should examine the record of the underlying controversy and hear testimony from the parties and counsel."

Lesson:  The "case within a case" method continues to be the golden test for proximate cause in legal malpractice matters.  In defending against malpractice actions, attorneys will be limited to those defenses the underlying adversary "would have" raised -- a fact sensitive determination. 

NJ's Petrillo v. Bachenberg, Kentucky Style: Attorney's Duties to Third-Parties

Tipton v. Porter, Court of Appeals of Kentucky, September 17, 2010

Facts:  The Tiptons purchased a home from the Lucases.  The Lucases engaged the services of Porter & Associates, Attorneys at Law.  The Tiptons never met any member of Porter & Associates, but were charged a portion of the overall closing fee associated with the transaction.

The Tiptons' purchase was owner financed.  Some point after the transaction was completed, the Tiptons failed to pay the Lucases.  As a result, the Lucases failed to make payment on a pre-existing mortgage -- that the Tiptons were unaware of -- with Community First Bank ("CFB").  CFB eventually filed a foreclosure action and the property was sold at a judicial sale.

The Tiptons, thereafter, sued Porter & Associates for legal malpractice. 

Issue:  Does an attorney owe a duty of care to third-parties?

Ruling:  Yes. 

The Kentucky Court of Appeals noted that the State has no privity requirements for legal malpractice actions:

Rather, an attorney may be held liable for damage caused by his negligence to a person intended to be benefited by his performance irrespective of any lack of privity.

The Court further noted that an attorney may be liable to a third-party who reasonably relies on him even where he did not supply any false information.  

Here, the Court found that Porter & Associates could be liable if, in breach of the applicable standard of care, they never undertook to complete a title exam to discover and disclose the existence of the CFB mortgage.  The Court held that "[e]xpert testimony would be required to answer this question as this is not the sort of question that would be within the common knowledge of a layperson."  The Appellate Division remanded the matter with instructions to allow the Tiptons time to retain an expert and conduct depositions.

Lesson:  In Kentucky, attorneys owe a duty of care to third-parties where the third-party reasonably relies on the attorney's performance to his or detriment.  The fact that the attorney did not give out false information is not dispositive -- the attorney may still be liable for malpractice for omissions under the applicable standard of care.

 

AL: "Blatant Error" Excused in Absence of Causation and Damages

Guyton v. Hunt, Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, July 23, 2010.

Facts:  Guyton was convicted of sexually abusing a minor.  After his conviction, he retained Hunt to prepare and file a motion for new trial, and if that was denied, file an appeal.  Hunt's motion for a new trial was denied, but he never advised Guyton or Guyton's family members.  Shortly thereafter, Guyton filed an action against Hunt alleging fraud and legal malpractice, arguing that the delay in learning his motion had been denied caused a delay in filing his notice of appeal.  Guyton further argued that he incurred damages by paying another attorney to handle his appeal even though Hunt had already been paid to do so.  

The lower court dismissed the complaint against Hunt for failure to produce an expert report. Guyton appealed.

Issue:  

  1. Could Hunt pursue a fraud claim separate and apart from a legal malpractice claim against Guyton?
  2. Was Hunt's negligence a blatant error, or was expert testimony necessary to establish a breach of the duty of care? 
  3. Was Hunt's negligence the proximate cause of any damage sustained by Guyton? 

Ruling: 

Alabama's Legal Services Liability Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

(1) Legal service liability action. Any action against a legal service provider in which it is alleged that some injury or damage was caused in whole or in part by the legal service provider's violation of the standard of care applicable to a legal service provider. A legal service liability action embraces all claims for injuries or damages or wrongful death whether in contract or in tort and whether based on an intentional or unintentional act or omission. A legal services liability action embraces any form of action in which a litigant may seek legal redress for a wrong or an injury and every legal theory of recovery, whether common law or statutory, available to a litigant in a court in the State of Alabama now or in the future.

Accordingly, Guyton's claim for fraud was subsumed by his claim for legal malpractice.  

The Appellate Court, however, disagreed with the lower court and held that "failure to notify a client of a ruling on a motion in time for the client to timely file an appeal constitutes a breach of the standard of care that is so apparent that expert testimony is not required for a layperson to understand that breach."  Nevertheless, the Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the malpractice action, since: 

Any delay, if indeed there was a delay, in filing Guyton's notice of appeal that may have been caused by Hunt's failure to "timely" notify Guyton of the denial of his postjudgment motion obviously did not preclude Guyton from timely filing his notice of appeal or prevent the Court of Criminal Appeals from considering his appeal. Guyton has not demonstrated that Hunt's delay, if any, caused Guyton harm. Furthermore, we conclude that based upon the record before us, Guyton failed to demonstrate that the outcome of his criminal case, i.e., his conviction and sentence, would have been any different had Hunt notified him of the denial of his postjudgment motion.

Moreover, with regard to damages, the Appellate Court noted that there was no evidence "Guyton himself contributed to [attorneys' fees].  Because Guyton did not pay any portion of the attorneys' fees in the underlying criminal action, he cannot claim he was damaged as a result of any allegedly unnecessary payments incurred because of Hunt's conduct."

Lesson:  In Alabama, multiple claims against a legal services provider will be subsumed under the "legal malpractice" umbrella.  Even where an attorney commits blatant negligence, the claim will be dismissed unless the former client is able to establish that he sustained damages as a result of the attorney's errors and omissions. 

 

NY: No Damage? No Recovery.

Vlahakis v.Mendelson & Associates, 54 A.D.3d 670, 863 N.Y.S.2d 479 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2008).

NY: Underlying bankruptcy proceeding

Student contributor: Nicole Milone

Facts: John Vlahakis retained Mendelson & Associates to advise him in his bankruptcy proceeding. The attorneys assured their client that he would not have to pay the arrears he owed on his home mortgage. Based upon this advice from counsel, Vlahakis did not pay. He then continued to live in his home for seven years without paying mortgage, taxes, and insurance.. Eventually, Vlahakis was required to pay the bank what he owed on his home mortgage. However, he did not provide any evidence to support his claim that this amount was more than the money he saved by living in his home for seven years without paying mortgage, taxes, and insurance.

Issue: Whether summary judgment dismissing a malpractice case was proper when the lawyer in the underlying matter gave a client inaccurate advice?

Ruling: Yes. Summary judgment was properly dismissed because the lawyer demonstrated the client did not sustain any damages due to the inaccurate advice.

Lesson: Even when an attorney makes a clear error and the client relies on that advice to his detriment, if the client cannot prove damages related to the mistake, there will not be an actionable claim for legal malpractice.

FL: Long Arm Jurisdiction Over Out of State Lawyers

Law Offices of Sybil Shainwald, et at., v. Barro, 817 So.2d 873 (2002)

FL: Underlying products liability suit

Student Contributor: Farah Shahidpour

Facts: Client hires a New York Attorney to represent her in a products liability suit. Client is attempting to recover damages against Bristol-Myers Squibb (“Bristol-Myers”) and Medical Engineering Corp. (“Medical”) for injuries caused to her by her breast implants. The suit was initially filed in New York. Attorney hired co-counsel Weitz & Luxemburg (“Weitz”), a New York law firm. The case was transferred to U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Weitz hired Florida counsel upon the transfer of the products liability suit to Florida. Bristol-Myers was dismissed from the action and a $757,568.64 judgment was entered against Medical. After the judgment was entered, Client amended her malpractice complaint where she alleged that Attorney was negligent and breach her fiduciary duty in handling the litigation. Client contends that the malpractice and damages that she suffered occurred in Florida. Attorney maintains that her representation ended when the case was transferred to Florida. Attorney filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In Attorney’s affidavits, she asserts that she never engaged in business in Florida and therefore is not subject to Florida’s jurisdiction. The trial court denied Attorney’s motion without affording her an evidentiary hearing.

Issue: Whether the trial court erred in denying Attorney’s motion without first holding an evidentiary hearing with regards to the jurisdictional issue?

Ruling: Yes. Even though Client responded by stating that Attorney remained involved in the representation after the transfer of the case to Weitz, Attorney was able to provide affidavits stating that (1) she did not receive any compensation for services to Client, (2) there was never any contract or fee arrangement with any Florida firm, and (3) after she transferred Client’s file to Weitz, she had no further contact with the Florida firm chosen by Weitz.

Lesson: When an attorney properly contests Florida’s long-arm jurisdiction, the client filing the malpractice suit now has the burden refute the evidence. If the client meets this burden by filing a response, Attorney may then counter Client’s response with supplemental affidavits. When affidavits are not consistent and conflicts exits, an evidentiary hearing must be afforded. In this case, the hearing would resolve disputed facts such as (1) provisions of any agreement concerning referral of the case by Attorney to Weitz, (2) the extent of Attorney’s representation after the case was transferred to Weitz and filed in Florida, and (3) whether Attorney received any compensation arising out of the Florida litigation.

 

MI: Statutes of Limitations in underlying IP cases

Wright v. Rinaldo, 279 Mich App 526; 761 NW2d 114 (2008)

Underlying patent prosecution USPTO

Student Contributor: Matthew Feinbloom


Facts: In August 2000,  Wright hired  Ronildo as his attorney in a patent case before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Three years after hiring Ronildo, Wright was dissatisfied with her work. Wright met with other patent attorneys and on December 18th, 2003 Wright signed a document that revoked Ronildo’s power of attorney before the USPTO. At this time Wright also signed the power of attorney over to another lawyer who then took over the case. Wright also instructed the Patient Office that all correspondence was to go through his new counsel. After key errors were made in the pursuit of this patent, Wright filed a legal malpractice suit against Ronildo on February 16, 2006. The lower court granted summary disposition for Ronildo holding that the attorney/client relationship ended on December 18th, 2003 thereby barring Wright’s action due to the two-year statute of limitations.

Issue: Does the attorney/client relationship end once the client revokes the power of attorney, hires new counsel and reassigns the power of attorney?

Ruling: Yes. Under Michigan law it does not have to be the court that effectively terminates the attorney/client relationship. If Wright had truly wanted Ronildo to stay on as co-counsel there would be no need to revoke her power of attorney. This revocation, along with the hiring and transfer of power of attorney to a new lawyer affirmatively communicated to Ronildo that she had been replaced and the attorney/client relationship had ended. Under MI law, “The client's action for malpractice is time-barred unless it is brought within two years from the date the claim accrued or arose (i.e., the date that services were discontinued), or within six months of the date that "the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the existence of the claim, whichever date occurs later.” MCL 600.5805(6); MCL 600.5838(2); Kloian v. Schwartz, 272 Mich. App. 232, 237, 725 N.W.2d 671 (2006). Therefore Ronildo’s motion for summary disposition was properly granted because two years had passed since the claim arose.

Lesson: Revoking the power of attorney, hiring a new lawyer, and giving that new counsel power of attorney is enough to terminate the attorney/client relationship. Once this relationship is over the statute of limitations begins to run on the amount of time the client is permitted to sue for malpractice.

AL: Alabama Legal Services Liability Act

Smith v. Math, 984 So.2d 1179 (2007)

AL: Underlying collection action

Student Contributor: Farah Shahidpour

Facts: Attorney, Math, practices law in Alabama. He filed a collection action against Smith in Montgomery District Court on behalf of his client, Max Federal Credit Union, Attorney obtained a default judgment against Smith in the amount of $2,767.71. Smith moved to set aside the judgment due to ineffective service of process. The district court granted the motion, set aside the judgment and scheduled the case for a later date. Even though the judgment was set aside, Attorney recorded the default judgment anyway. When the district court later heard the merits of the case, it entered a final judgment against Smith. This created two identical judgments against Smith. Attorney made no attempts to correct this error. Smith claims that Attorney’s recording of the judgment that had been set aside was fraudulent and had an adverse effect on him and sought damages in the amount of $25,000. Attorney argued that Smith had claims of legal malpractice and that the ALSLA required Smith to support his claims with expert testimony. Attorney argues that because claims arose from his rendition of legal services, the ALSLA is the exclusive remedy. Attorney further contends that because Smith was never his client and he never provided legal services to him, he owed no duty to Smith.

Issue: Whether a nonclient, who has never received legal services from an attorney, but who has alleged injury resulting from an attorney’s performance of legal services to a third party is entitled to a remedy?

Ruling: Yes. The ALSLA creates only one form and cause of action against legal service providers in the state of Alabama: the legal-service-liability action. However, the court  ruled that  if a party is not a client, and no privity exists, the ALSLA does not apply and is not the exclusive remedy.

Lesson: A third party who has not received legal services but was adversely affected by the attorney’s providing legal services  can still recover under common-law negligence or fraud. The ALSLA is not an exclusive remedy nor is it a bar against non-client claims against lawyers.  

SC: Filing Frivolous Actions Result in Attorney Sactions

Ex parte Gregory, 378 S.C. 430 (S.C. 2008)

SC: Underlying tort action

Student Contributor: Karen Dindayal

Facts:  Jerry Bittle sustained brain injuries from an automobile accident, rendering him mentally incompetent. Bittle’s mother, Melton, retained Gerald Malloy to represent Bittle in recovering for his injuries. Melton and Bittle reached a settlement with the insurance company for the claims made, and made several attempts to contact Malloy regarding receiving the settlement funds, but could not reach him. As a result, Melton terminated Malloy’s services for failing to account for the settlement money. Melton then retained George W. Gregory to represent her and Bittle in recovering the settlement funds from Malloy. Fearing that the statute of limitations would soon run, Gregory filed the instant action against Malloy alleging causes of action for negligence, conversion, breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and constructive trust.

After the action was commenced, Malloy transferred the funds in dispute to Gregory, and filed a motion for Rule 11 Sanctions and counsel fees and expenses against Gregory, claiming specifically that the allegations of conversion were frivolous. Malloy reasoned that Sanctions were appropriate since Gregory relied soley upon Melton’s statements that she did not know where the settlement funds were, instead of conducting a thorough and independent investigation himself to determine the status of the funds.

Issue:  Did the circuit court correctly find that the suit against Malloy was frivolous because Gregory failed to conduct a proper investigation?

Did the circuit court properly award Malloy attorney fees and expenses?

Ruling  Yes. An attorney may be sanctioned and subject to counsel fees and expenses pursuant to the Frivolous Proceedings Act for bringing a frivolous claim due to that attorney’s failure to first conduct a proper and reasonable investigation into the facts.

Lesson:  Before commencing an action, it is important to first always conduct a thorough and reasonable investigation to ensure a sufficient basis for the action(s) being brought. 

ME: Effect of Factual Determinations by Fee Arb Panel

Perry v. Emerson, Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, October 26, 2010. 

Facts:  Emerson initiated a fee arbitration proceeding against her former attorneys, alleging that she never agreed to be responsible for the legal fees incurred in her divorce action and she was led to believe her husband would be responsible for the fees.

The arbitration panel determined that: 

Emerson routinely asked Perry and K&P about her obligation to pay fees billed to her, indicating that she doubted that her husband would actually pay her fees, and that she "was fully cognizant of" the possibility that a provision requiring her then-husband to pay her attorney fees "might not be a part of the ultimate judgment or settlement agreement." The panel also found that Emerson was aware that the final divorce agreement did not require her husband to pay her legal fees.

Based on this determination, Emerson's attorneys moved for summary judgment in a pending malpractice action.  The lower court concluded that Emerson's prior litigation of factual issues concerning her obligation to pay her own attorney's fees before the arbitration panel precluded re-litigation in the form of a malpractice complaint.  Emerson appealed.

Issues:  Can the factual determinations of a fee arbitration committee preclude litigation of a pending malpractice action? 

Ruling:  Perhaps. 

The findings made by a Fee Arbitration Panel, to the extent necessary to its determination, have preclusive effect for purposes of collateral estoppel.  A valid and final award by arbitration has the same effect under the rules of res judicata as a judgment of a court, so long as the process contains the essential elements of "adjudication":

(1) adequate notice, (2) the right to present evidence and legal argument and to rebut opposing evidence and argument, (3) a formulation of issues of law or fact to apply rules to specified parties concerning a specified transaction, (4) the rendition of a final decision, and (5) any other procedural elements as may be necessary to constitute the proceeding a sufficient means of conclusively determining the matter in question.

The lack of de novo review of the panel's decision is not a factor that is considered in determining the decision's preclusive effect. 

Based on this analysis, the Court held that Emerson's claim of an oral agreement/contract with her former attorneys that she would not pay her own attorney's fees was necessarily barred. 

The Court also barred, for different reasons, Emerson's claim of negligence against her former attorneys for their failure to include a provision in the settlement agreement providing that her husband would pay her attorney's fees.  The Court noted that the arbitration panel's determinations would have no bearing on this issue, since it was not necessary to the resolution of the fee dispute. Rather, Emerson was estopped from pursuing her negligence claim because she failed to present necessary expert testimony: 

The appropriate standard of care, and whether [the attorneys] breached a duty of zealous representation to Emerson by negotiating a divorce settlement that did not include a requirement that Emerson's ex-husband pay all of her attorney fees, is not obvious or within a layman's common knowledge and would have required expert testimony.

Lesson:  A fee arbitration panel's determinations will have preclusive effect on a pending or subsequent malpractice litigation, so long as those factual determinations were necessary to a resolution of the fee dispute.  Expert opinion is necessary to contest whether or not an attorney adequately drafted a settlement agreement.

 

GA: No Affidavit of Merit for Fraud, Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claims

Crosby v. Pittman, Court of Appeals of Georgia, August 20, 2010. 

Facts:  Crosby retained Pittman to represent him with respect to a traffic citation.  Pittman advised Crosby that he would need to pay $350 to resolve the citation.  Crosby gave Pittman $350, only to learn that the citation was for $300 and it had never actually been paid.  

Crosby then sued Pittman for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.  The lower court dismissed Crosby's complaint for failure to file an affidavit of merit pursuant to OCGA Section 9-11-9.1.  Crosby appealed.

Issue:  Is an affidavit of merit necessary for claims against an attorney other than legal malpractice, ie. fraud and breach of fiduciary duty?

Ruling:  No.  

The applicable Georgia statute requires that any complaint alleging professional malpractice against an attorney be accompanied by an expert affidavit setting forth at least one negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.  The appellate court, therefore, held that by its very language, the statute was only applicable to professional malpractice actions. The Court further noted: 

Additionally, claims for breach of fiduciary duty do not require an expert affidavit as they are not based on negligence involving the performance of the professional's services.

Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of Crosby's complaint. 

Lesson:  In Georgia, plaintiffs need not obtain an affidavit of merit to pursue claims of fraud or breach of fiduciary duty against their former attorney.

OH: Failure to Name Individual Attorney Results in Dismissal of Malpractice Action

Bohan v. Jackson, Court of Appeals of Ohio, July 22, 2010. 

Facts:  Shortly prior to his death, Bohan's father indicated his desire to his attorney, Kennedy, to amend a revocable trust to make Bohan the sole beneficiary.  The father executed a handwritten statement, in Kennedy's presence, directing his firm to amend the trust agreement accordingly.  The father died two days later, and Kennedy's firm had not amended the trust agreement.  Kennedy thereafter advised Bohan that the handwritten note was not a legal document that could alter the terms of his late father's trust. 

Bohan then brought a malpractice action against Kennedy's firm.  The lower court dismissed the action for failure to name a party against whom relief could be granted and Bohan appealed.

Issue:  Is it necessary to name an individual attorney, or can relief for legal malpractice be awarded only against a law firm? 

Ruling:  The Court of Appeals held that "a law firm does not engage in the practice of law, and therefore, cannot directly commit legal malpractice."  Accordingly, by naming only the firm as a defendant, Bohan failed to name a party against whom relief could be granted.

The Court further noted that Bohan's action would have been dismissed for lack of privity, even if he had named Kennedy individually.  Here, the trust at issue was revocable.  Accordingly, Bohan's interest did not vest until his father's death.  Without a vested interest in the trust, Bohan was not in privity with the firm, and therefore, could not prove an essential element of a legal malpractice action -- that Kennedy, or his firm, owed Bohan a duty of care.

Lesson:  Under Ohio law, an action for legal malpractice against a law firm alone is not viable. Further, plaintiff must be able to establish an attorney-client relationship or privity with the defendants.

CO: Issue Preclusion in Legal Malpractice

Stanton v. Schultz, 222 P.3d 303 (CO Jan. 11, 2010). 

Facts:  Schultz brought a post-conviction motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in a federal criminal prosecution.  In that motion, he argued that his attorneys failed to call an essential witness, Pedro Castillo, whose testimony would have led to Schultz's acquittal.  

The district court denied Schultz's motion and held:  (1) Schultz failed to show that this newly discovered evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence; (2) even if Castillo had testified, Schultz likely would have been convicted.  The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling only on ground one and expressly refused to consider whether or not Castillo's testimony would have had any impact on Schultz's conviction. 

Schultz then filed a legal malpractice action against his former attorneys.  The trial court granted the attorneys' motion to dismiss on the basis that the malpractice action was precluded by the court's holdings in Schultz's post-conviction motion.  The appellate court reversed and the attorneys appealed.

Issue:  Can a claim for legal malpractice be precluded by factual determinations in the underlying action? 

Ruling:  Perhaps.

In making its determination, the Court first set forth each of the requirements that must be satisfied to bar re-litigation under issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel: 

(1) the issue is identical to an issue actually litigated and necessarily adjudicated in the prior proceeding; (2) the party against whom estoppel was sought was a party to or was in privity with a party to the prior proceeding; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior proceeding; and (4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior proceeding.

The first requirement was satisfied in that Schultz had to demonstrate, in both proceedings, that he would not have been convicted had his former attorneys presented Castillo's testimony.  This issue, however, was not "necessarily adjudicated" in the previous proceeding, since the Tenth Circuit denied Schultz's motion only on due diligence grounds, and expressly declined to consider whether Castillo's testimony  would have led to an acquittal.  The Court relied on Comment o to The Restatement (Second) of Judgments, Section 27: 

Effect of an appeal. If the judgment of the court of first instance was based on a determination of two issues, either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, and . . . the appellate court upholds one of these determinations as sufficient and refuses to consider whether or not the other is sufficient and accordingly affirms the judgment, the judgment is conclusive as to the first determination.

Since the only ground actually considered and upheld by the appellate court may be given preclusive effect, the issue of whether or not Castillo's testimony would have impacted Schultz's conviction was open to litigation in the malpractice proceeding.  The Court further noted that comment o was supported by sound reasoning:

when the Tenth Circuit declined to review the causation issue, it effectively denied Schultz his right to appeal that issue. Preclusive effect should not be given to such a determination because our precedent requires an opportunity for review before a judgment can be considered final for purposes of issue preclusion.

Lesson: An issue presented in a legal malpractice action will be subject to preclusion only where it has previously been considered and upheld by the appellate court in the underlying action.  If the appellate court declines to consider certain grounds, those grounds are subject to re-litigation in a future proceeding.  

WA: Attorneys May Not Subtract Contingency Fee From Legal Malpractice Damage Award

Shoemake v. Ferrer, 225 P.3d 990 (WA Feb. 4,  2010). 

Facts:  After attorney Ferrer mishandled Plaintiffs' personal injury case and failed to advise them of a $100,000 settlement offer, Plaintiffs sued for legal malpractice and asked for the full amount they would have received in settlement, without subtracting Ferrer's contingency fee, plus interest.

The trial court held that Ferrer ought to be allowed to subtract his contingency fee.  The appellate court reversed and Ferrer appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington. 

Issue:  Is an attorney allowed to subtract his hypothetical fees in the underlying action from an award for damages in a legal malpractice action? 

Ruling:  No.

Washington followed the approach taken by the majority of the jurisdictions and held:

[C]alculating damages without deducting a negligent attorney's hypothetical contingency fee is an appropriate measure of damages. The Shoemakes had to expend fees on a second lawyer in order to finish the job the first lawyer neglected to do. The majority approach makes the plaintiffs whole without conferring a windfall.

Additionally, the Court held that the Shoemakes were entitled to prejudgment interest on the full amount of their damages in the legal malpractice action, including the portion that Ferrer would have been entitled to as his contingency fee had he properly litigated the underlying matter. 

Lesson:  In a majority of the jurisdictions, including Washington, attorneys will not be allowed to deduct their hypothetical fees in the underlying matter from the damages awarded to their former clients in a subsequent legal malpractice action. 

PA: No Privity, No Certificate of Merit

Sabella v. Estate of Milides, 992 A.2d 180 (Pa. Superior March 25, 2010). 

Facts:  The representatives of the Estate of Milides commenced an action arguing that Sabella participated in a fraudulent transfer of property to avoid satisfaction of a substantial judgment. Sabella filed preliminary objections.  Shortly thereafter, the Estate, through its attorney, filed a praecipe (writ) for satisfaction and termination of the civil suit, indicating it was "settled, discontinued, ended with prejudice and costs paid".  Sabella then filed the instant action for abuse of process against the Estate and its attorney, alleging wrongful use of civil proceedings.  

The Estate's attorney argued that the instant action ought to be dismissed because of Sabella's failure to file a certificate of merit in a "professional liability" matter.  Sabella disagreed since he had no attorney-client relationship with the Estate's attorney, and characterized the matter as an "abuse of process" case, rather than professional malpractice.  Sabella appealed after the lower court dismissed his action for failure to file a certificate of merit against the Estate's attorney.

Issue:  Does Pennsylvania require a Certificate of Merit in a civil action against an attorney for abuse of process by a third-party? 

Ruling:  No. 

The Court noted that two factors determine whether a claim alleges ordinary negligence as opposed to professional negligence: 

  • Whether the claim pertains to an action that has occurred within the course of a professional relationship; and 
  • Whether the claim raises questions of professional judgment beyond the realm of common knowledge and experience.

The Court further provided: 

Our Supreme Court retained privity (an attorney-client or analogous professional relationship, or a specific undertaking) as an element of proof necessary to maintain an action in negligence for professional malpractice. The only exception being a narrow class of third party beneficiaries under Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 302 where the intent to benefit is clear and the promisee (testator) is unable to enforce the contract.

***

If a complaint does not set forth a cause of action for legal malpractice, a certificate of merit is not required.

The Court held that Sabella's cause of action did not arise from within the course of a professional relationship with the Estate's attorney, nor was Sabella a third-party beneficiary.  Consequently, the lower court erred in designating Sabella's case as one of professional liability and dismissing it for failure to file a certificate of merit.

Lesson:  In Pennsylvania, a third-party need not file a certificate of merit in an action against an attorney.  By definition, given the lack of privity between the attorney and the third-party plaintiff, the action cannot be one for "professional malpractice."

First Circuit: Emotional Distress Damages in Legal Malpractice

Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196 (1st Cir. September 9, 1987).

Facts:  After what appeared to be a series of misunderstandings between Wagenmann and his family members, Wagenmann was searched and arrested without a warrant, brought to a holding cell, and ultimately, involuntarily admitted to a mental hospital.  His court-appointed attorney, Healy, entered a general appearance on Wagenmann's behalf in connection with the commitment proceedings, bail and criminal charges.  

Allegedly, Healy never inquired as to what had happened, but did say that he was a friend and fellow parishioner of one of the individuals who had been responsible for reporting Healy to the police.  When Wagenmann asked Healy to withdraw and get him another lawyer, Healy apparently refused.  Healy also refused Wagenmann's requests to be brought before a judge.  

Instead, Healy proposed that Wagenmann immediately leave town or agree to be committed to a mental hospital. Wagenmann refused and a psychiatrist present at the time saw no grounds upon which Wagenmann could be admitted.  Healy then commented "maybe in New York you're something, but [in Massachusetts], you're nothing," and left.  

Wagenmann was later informed that he had in fact been committed to a mental hospital for a twenty day observation period.  After some time, Wagenmann was visited by a psychiatrist who saw no basis to justify his admission and arranged for his immediate release.

Wagenmann subsequently sued Healy for legal malpractice, requesting damages for emotional distress.  Wagenmann was awarded damages against Healy and Healy appealed.

Issue:  Is a Plaintiff in a legal malpractice suit entitled to damages for emotional distress? 

Ruling:  Yes, if it is foreseeable from the attorney-client relationship that a breach of the applicable standard of care will cause the client to suffer a loss of liberty or social stigma.

The Court noted that "an attorney who commits malpractice is liable to client for any reasonably foreseeable loss caused by his negligence."  If it were otherwise, especially in situations where the attorney-client relationship was based on something other than the client's economic concerns, the attorney would effectively be immunized from liability even though he exposed his client to a "parade of horribles."

Here, Wagenmann was entitled to damages for emotional distress -- He had been involuntarily confined to a mental hospital as a result of his attorney's negligence and alleged misconduct.  This, in turn, caused Wagenmann continuing anguish and fear that others, including prospective employers, would learn of it and question his sanity.  Consequently, the Court concluded: 

That Healy was guilty of malpractice in the defense of commitment proceedings, rather than in the prosecution of a civil claim for damages, is no reason artificially to shield him from the condign consequences of his carelessness. 

Lesson:  Emotional damages are recoverable in legal malpractice action where the client's damages include something other than a purely economic loss, i.e. incarceration, false imprisonment, or significant injury to reputation. 

PA: Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege Remains Undecided

Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fleming et al., 992 A2d 65 (PA 2010). 

Facts:  In the underlying action, Nationwide alleged that a number of its former agents accessed confidential policyholder information from Nationwide's internal computer system and then provided it to competitors.  At trial, defense counsel questioned the president of Nationwide with respect to a memo labeled "Document No. 529."  Nationwide asserted it was protected by the attorney-client privilege, and redacted all information with the exception of the author, recipient list, date and subject line.  The memo had been sent by Nationwide's in-house counsel to 15 Nationwide employees.  

Defendants argued that even if Document No. 529 was privileged, Nationwide had waived the privilege by disclosing two other privileged documents on the subject of agent defection (Document Nos. 314 and 395).  In other words, Nationwide could not use the privilege as a "sword and a shield" by selectively disclosing only those privileged documents favorable to its position. 

Nationwide argued that the other two documents were not protected because they were merely business communications devoid of any confidential communications made by Nationwide for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.

The lower court first examined Documents 314 and 395 to determine whether the production of those documents constituted a disclosure of confidential information by Nationwide.  The Court determined that production of these documents did not amount to a disclosure of privileged information because the information contained in the memos was not confidential or conveyed to an attorney for the purpose of securing legal advice, assistance, or opinion.  Rather, the documents constituted routine business communications.

Consequently, the Court held that Nationwide had not waived the attorney-client privilege by producing Documents 314 and 395.  Nevertheless, the Court ordered disclosure of Document 529 for the following reasons: 

  • Document 529 was a communication from counsel to a group of managers of a corporate client -- The attorney-client privilege protection is available only for confidential communications made by the client to counsel.  Communications from counsel to a client are only protected to the extent they reveal confidential communications previously made by the client to counsel for purposes of obtaining legal advice.
  • Document 529 did not reveal any confidential communications from Nationwide to its in-house counsel for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.  Rather, much like Documents 314 and 395, it was a memo concerning business strategy with regard to agent defections.  
  • The Court further noted that counsel's general opinion as to what is likely achievable via litigation is not protected by the attorney-client privilege in the event it does not reveal the client's confidential communications.

Nationwide appealed.

Issue:  What is the scope of the attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania? 

Ruling:  The Supreme Court was equally divided and the Order of the lower court was, therefore, affirmed.

Justices Eakin and Baer, in favor of affirmance, noted that Nationwide had waived the attorney-client privilege by previously disclosing other, favorable documents with regard to the same "subject matter": 

[T]he disclosure of Documents 314 and 395 form the basis of subject matter waiver of the attorney-client privilege regarding Document 529, the scope of which extends to Document 529 because it contains the same subject matter. What distinguishes Document 529 from Documents 314 and 395 is counsel's unflattering concessions regarding the litigation's purpose and prospect of succeeding. [A]ppellants seem to have produced only the documents beneficial to their case by disclosing Documents 314 and 395, and withholding Document 529 based on its privileged nature. I believe appellants waived the attorney-client privilege with respect to the subject of agent defections upon disclosing Documents 314 and 395, and cannot claim the privilege applies to a document containing the same subject matter, as well as potentially damaging admissions.

Justices Saylor and Castille, in favor of reversal, noted: 

Document 529 describes, among other things, [discusses] the present litigation in several states involving Appellants, their former agents, and their new companies. Namely, it discusses the nature of these suits, the money damages sought, the purpose behind the litigation, Appellants' likelihood of success, and the other remedies available to Appellants against defecting agents. It also includes counsel's recommendations regarding Appellants' use of specific contract provisions, as well as the possibility of filing complaints with the insurance departments of certain states. 

***

[The document] both reveals information apparently communicated by management and, more generally, reflects in-house counsel's knowledge apparently derived from familiarity with business aspects. The memorandum proceeds to detail strategies that appear to reflect prior decisions made by management upon legal consultation...

Lesson:  The Scope of the attorney-client privilege in Pennsylvania remains undecided.  Arguments for disclosure can be made based on "subject matter" waiver, or the fact that the communication discloses no confidential information related to the attorney for purposes of legal advice.  An argument for protection under the attorney-client privilege can be made based on the principle that an attorney's case-specific advice is necessarily intermixed with and dependent upon information the client shares in confidence.  

Third Circuit: Violation of RPC 1.7 Does Not Require Automatic Disqualification

Wyeth v. Abbott Laboratories, 692 F.Supp.2d 453 (D.N.J. 2010)

Facts:  Wyeth brought a motion to disqualify Howrey LLP from representing Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. ("BSC") in an underlying patent infringement action.  Wyeth alleged that it was a conflict of interest for Howrey to represent BSC against Wyeth in the underlying action, while representing Wyeth in a separate, ongoing patent matter in Europe.  More specifically, Wyeth contended that Howrey's conduct was in violation of RPC 1.7(a)(1).  

The Court held that Howrey's conduct was in violation of RPC 1.7 and disqualified Howrey, interpreting applicable case law as requiring mandatory disqualification for a violation of RPC 1.7. Howrey appealed.

Issue:  Can a law firm represent an adversary of a current client in another, unrelated matter? 

Ruling:  Perhaps. 

The Court first determined that BSC, a defendant in the underlying patent litigation, and Wyeth, a plaintiff in that litigation, were adversaries, and that Howrey was representing Wyeth in the separate European patent matter, thus creating a current attorney-client relationship between Wyeth and Howrey.  

RPC 1.7(a)(1) provides that a concurrent conflict of interest exists if the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client. Accordingly, the Court then moved on to the question of whether a violation of RPC 1.7 requires disqualification.  In making this determination, the Court stated:

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that "[a]lthough disqualification ordinarily is the result of a finding that a disciplinary rule prohibits an attorney's appearance in a case, disqualification never is automatic." U.S. v. Miller, 624 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir.1980). The question of whether disqualification is appropriate is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, which "means that the court should disqualify an attorney only when it determines, on the facts of the particular case, that disqualification is an appropriate means of enforcing the applicable disciplinary rule." Id.

The Court then set forth twelve factors to be considered in determining whether disqualification was warranted: 

(1) prejudice to Wyeth; (2) prejudice to BSC; (3) whether's Howrey's representation of Wyeth in the [European] matter allowed BSC access to any confidential information relevant to this case; (4) the cost—in terms of both time and money—for BSC to retain new counsel; (5) the complexity of the issues in the case and the time it would take new counsel to acquaint themselves with the facts and issues; (6) which party, if either, was responsible for creating the conflict; [7] whether the two matters at issue are related in substance; [8] whether both matters are presently active; [9] whether any attorneys from the firm have been involved in both matters; [10] whether the matters are each being handled from offices in different geographic locations; [11] whether the attorneys from the law firm work with different client representative[s] for each matter; and [12] the relative time billed by the law firm to each matter.

Ultimately, the Court found that there was no evidence that Howrey's independent professional judgment would be impaired if it was permitted to continue as counsel for BSC, since the matters were completely unrelated and no Howrey attorneys overlapped on the two matters.  Additionally, Howrey had put up an "ethical wall" with regard to the attorneys working on the matters, as well as the confidential information with regard to each matter.  With regard to prejudice to each party, the Court noted: 

Given Howrey's historical representation and the complex technologies at issue in this case, depriving BSC of its counsel of choice deprives BSC of Howrey's depth of experience and expertise. Additionally, if BSC were required to obtain new counsel, there would likely be some delay in this litigation as well as certain additional costs incurred by BSC while new counsel familiarized itself with this case. In contrast, Wyeth has not identified any prejudice that it will suffer if Howrey is not disqualified from this matter.

Consequently, the Court allowed Howrey to continue as counsel for BSC in the underlying patent litigation. 

Lesson:  Whether or not a law firm will be disqualified for a concurrent conflict of interest under RPC 1.7 is a fact sensitive determination.  It will depend on, among other factors, the remoteness of the two matters at issue, the existence of an ethical wall, the historical relationship between the law firm and the two clients, and potential prejudice to either party.

CA: Statute of Limitations for Legal Malpractice Tolled in Attorney's Absence

Jocer Enterprises, Inc. v. Ernest Price at al., Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Four, 183 Cal. App. 4th 559 (April 5, 2010).

Facts:  Allegedly, the defendant attorney provided negligent legal representation in trade secret and malicious prosecution actions and plaintiffs suffered damages as a result.  The defendant attorney was absent from California during the year preceding the filing date of the plaintiffs' malpractice action. The defendant attorney argued that plaintiffs' action was time-barred under California's one-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions.  Plaintiffs' contended the applicable statute of limitations was tolled during defendant's absence from California.

Issue:  Does an attorney's absence from the state toll the statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions in California? 

Ruling:  Yes. 

California's statute of limitations for legal malpractice actions provides: 

An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first.

The limitations period contains certain tolling provisions which provide: 

[I]n no event shall the time for commencement of legal action exceed four years except that the period shall be tolled during the time that any of the following exist:

(1) The plaintiff has not sustained actual injury;

(2) The attorney continues to represent the plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred;

(3) The attorney willfully conceals the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission when such facts are known to the attorney, except that this subdivision shall toll only the four-year limitation; or 

(4) The plaintiff is under a legal or physical disability which restricts the plaintiff's ability to commence legal action.

With the exception of provision (3) each tolling provision applies to both the one-year and four-year limitations periods for legal malpractice actions.  

In making a determination as to whether plaintiffs' action was tolled during the time the defendant attorney was absent from California, the Court relied on Bledstein v. Superior Court.  In Bledstein, the Court tolled plaintiff's time to file a legal malpractice action for four years while plaintiff was incarcerated on criminal charges.  The Court drew a parallell in the instant action and held that an attorney's absence qualifies as a "legal disability" which, essentially, restricts plaintiff's ability to pursue his malpractice action against his former attorney.

Lesson:  In California, the limitations period for legal malpractice actions will be tolled during the time the defendant attorney is out of the state.