Legal Malpractice Law Review : Professional Responsibility Case Summaries & Commentary : Bennett J. Wasserman : LegalMalpractice.com : Lawyer Malpractice & Legal Ethics

Gelsomino v.Gorov, 502 N.E.2d 264, 149 Ill.App.3d 809, (App. Ct. Ill., 1986)

IL Underlying Representation: Insurance coverage lawsuit

Student Contributor: John Anzalone

Facts: Plaintiffs sue Attorney and his law firm for legal malpractice for negligently investigating, preparing and presenting Plaintiffs in a lawsuit against the insurer that failed to cover the loss of their restaurant to a fire. Plaintiffs obtained Attorney as their counsel shortly before trial after their previous attorney had to withdraw because he was involved in an ongoing trial. The jury found for Insurer on the grounds that the plaintiffs' had committed arson and fraud.

Issue: Did the lower court err in holding that since the plaintiff did not present a question of fact regarding proximate cause or the attorney's breach of duty, the alleged errors were not actionable because they were errors of judgment, and that Plaintiffs were barred from claiming Defendant was negligent?

The Ruling: In reversing the lower court, the Appellate Court held that summary judgment was improperly given, based on the following considerations:
1) Plaintiffs are estopped from relitigating facts in one action that were specifically litigated and decided in a prior action. The Plaintiff's post-trial motion in the underlying case claiming that the court erred in not granting continuance and that this resulted in their counsel being unprepared did not bar Plaintiffs from asserting that Defendants were negligent.
2) To prove legal malpractice, Plaintiffs must establish that there was an attorney-client relationship, "a duty arising out of that relationship" that was breached, and that the breach proximately caused Plaintiffs' actual damages.
3) Plaintiffs were Attorney's client and were damaged by the jury verdict.
4) There was a question of fact regarding the attorney's breach of duty because Plaintiffs.rovided expert testimony alleging specific breaches of the attorney duty of care to Plaintiffs.
5) There was a question of fact about proximate cause because Plaintiffs supplied affidavits of people Defendants' knew about but failed to investigate whose testimony would have rebutted the circumstantial proof of arson and fraud alleged by Insurer.
6) An error of judgment is not immune for prosecution. If the attorney's judgment was one that a reasonably competent attorney would not come to, the attorney can be held liable for failing to exercise a "reasonable degree of care or skill in representing his client."

The Lesson: Errors of judgment is not an absolute defense to lawyer malpractice.  It is no defense that the allegedly negligent attorney's judgment was a non-actionable tactical choice if a reasonable attorney would not come to that conclusion. 

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Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484, 555 A.2d 58 (Penn. 1989)

PA Underlying med mal and personal injury cases

Student Contributor: Evan Michael Hess 

Facts: The clients retained the  attorney in a case arising from a medical malpractice  against a physician and hospital and a personal injury suit against the city of Philadelphia. The attorney did not seek to have the two suits joined, and reassured the clients that the medical malpractice case was still viable. The jury in the personal injury lawsuit returned a verdict for the clients.  The medical malpractice case was dismissed soon thereafter based upon a lack of evidence and that the personal injury suit had fully compensated the clients for the injuries sustained. The clients initiated the legal malpractice action alleging the attorney negligently settled the personal injury case, breached his fiduciary duties, and improperly accounted for costs and expenses. A bench trial was conducted, and the clients were awarded damages.

Issue: Was the trial court correct in finding in favor of the client that the attorney breached his professional duties, and were the damages awarded reasonable?

Ruling: The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that:

1) An attorney's must communicate all settlement offers to clients;

2) Failure to investigate offers that were proposed constituted malpractice;

3) Aggrieved clients are entitled to recover as damages the difference between actual recovery and the amount they would have recovered if the attorney was not negligent; and

“The necessity of an attorney’s use of ordinary skill and knowledge extends to the conduct of settlement negotiations.”

Lesson: The attorney must fully communicate to his client all proposed settlement offers in addition to completing due diligence in investigations on the client’s behalf. If an attorney fails to perform her/his duties in accordance with the standard of professional care, they must make the client whole by paying the difference between what the client did receive and should have received in a settlement. 

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State of New Jersey v. Dennis Copling, 326 N.J. Super. 417, 741 A.2d 624 (1999)

NJ: Underlying criminal defense

Student Contributor: Evan Michael Hess

Facts: Appellant was convicted of first degree conspiracy to commit murder, first degree murder, manslaughter, possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose and third degree unlawful possession of a handgun. Represented by the Public Defender’s Office, the Appellant alleged, among other things, that his counsel of record was a personal friend of the chief investigator assigned to the case, and a witness for the State at trial, and that, therefore, possessed a conflict of interest in representation. The Defendant notified his defense counsel that he was concerned with counsel’s ability to perform a competent cross examination of the investigator. Counsel then notified the court of the defendant’s concerns, noting that he did not believe there to exist any conflict of interest. The Court denied the Defense motion to continue. The Court later learned that the Defendant knew of his defense counsel’s preexisting friendship with the chief investigator, but chose not to raise the issue until roughly one year later, shortly before trial.

Issue: Does an attorney’s conflict of interest stemming from a pre-existing friendship, or the appearance of impropriety render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair?

Ruling: Relying on the Rules of Professional Conduct in New Jersey, Section 1.7(b), the Court held:

1) Legal counsel in criminal matters must have undivided loyalty to their clients and have representation that is "untrammeled and unimpaired" by conflicting interests. See State v. Bellucci, 81 N.J. 531, 538 (1980);
2) Friendship alone, without more, should not preclude effective representation;

Lesson: While the appearance of impropriety may exist, a conflict of interest does not exist unless counsel is prevented from serving as a "vigorous partisan" of the client's interest. Furthermore, in accordance with the Rules of Professional Conduct, legal counsel cannot represent a client if the attorney is limited by his/her responsibilities to a third person or limited by the attorney's own interests.

Note: New Jersey's Rules of Professional Conduct  no longer recognizes the appearance of  impropriety as prohibited conduct for lawyers.  

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Ellison v. Schenck, Price, Smith & King, 654 A.2d 1024 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1995)

NJ: Underlying Real Estate and Litigation

Student Contributor: John J. Anzalone

Facts: Plaintiff's entered into a lease for developing cemetery grounds. Defendant represented both Plaintiff and the Cemetery. The Defendant also represented the plaintiff in negotiating the terms of the sublease of leased land. After the lease had become unprofitable for Plaintiff, Plaintiff sued Defendant. Plaintiff asserted that they relied on defendant's advice to enter into the contract because they were wrongly led to believe there was nothing preventing the lawful lease of the land. Plaintiff also claimed they suffered loses because the defendant failed to put an escalation clause in the contract with the person they sublet to.

Issue: Could the statute of limitations only have started to run when Plaintiff's income from the property decreased and thus entitle defendant to dismissal of the case?

Ruling: In affirming the lower court's decision on other grounds, the Appellate Division held that the lower court erred in dismissing the case based on the statute of limitations because there was a question of fact regarding when the actual damages occurred, based on the following consideration:
1) The cause of action arises when the plaintiff knows or should have known that they were actually damaged by the attorney's negligence.
2) The actual damage did not necessarily occur when Plaintiff's profits were lessened by the increased rent, they could have also occurred when the rate increase made the sublease unprofitable.

Lesson: Statute of limitations for legal malpractice start to run once the Plaintiff knew or should have known that they were actually damaged by the attorney's negligence. This determination is fact sensitive. Thus, in practice a lawyer bringing a suit against the other lawyer for malpractice should not assume that the actual damage that the plaintiff knew or should have known about occurred when it seems the Plaintiff was first injured by the alleged negligence. 

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Ellison v. Schenck, Price, Smith & King, 654 A.2d 1024 (N.J.Super.A.D. 1995)

NJ Underlying Real Estate and Litigation

Student Contributor: John J. Anzalone

Facts: Plaintiff's entered into a lease for developing cemetery grounds. Defendant represented both Plaintiff and the Cemetery. The Defendant also represented the plaintiff in negotiating the terms of the sublease of leased land. After the lease had become unprofitable for Plaintiff, Plaintiff sued Defendant. Plaintiff asserted that they relied on defendant's advice to enter into the contract because they were wrongly led to believe there was nothing preventing the lawful lease of the land. Plaintiff also claimed they suffered loses because the defendant failed to put an escalation clause in the contract with the person they sublet to.

Issue: Did plaintiff's failure to sue the attorney in the suit against the cemetery preclude them from later suing the attorney? 

Ruling: The court affirmed the dismissal of the suit by holding that Plaintiff was barred from suing he should have sued the attorney as well in an earlier suit against the cemetery, based on the following considerations:
1) Under New Jersey's "Entire Controversy Doctrine", any suit against an indispensable party that should have been added to a prior suit, results in the inability to bring a suit against that party that is part of the same dispute.
2) Parties are indispensable when the case cannot be decided between the parties present in the suit without judging or affecting the interest of the party that should have been added.
3) Had the plaintiffs won, the Defendant would have been hampered by the decision in protecting itself from being found liable for substantial damages.

Lesson: New Jersey's "Entire Controversy Doctrine" provides an effective shield from suits by client-plaintiffs who fail to add a claim against an allegedly negligent lawyer to a suit that is ongoing and in which the lawyer's alleged negligence took place.

NOTE: In response to an uproar from its decision in Circle Chevrolet v.Giordanno Halleran & Ciesla, 142 N.J. 280 (1995) which held that the entire controversy doctrine bars subsequent legal malpractice claims, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed that holding in Olds v. Donnelly, 150 N.J. 424 (1997) and held that legal malpractice cases are exempt from the entire controversy doctrine. Thus, this case is no longer good law on the issue of the entire controversy's applicability to legal malpractice actions. 

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Adamopoulos v. Liotti, 708 N.Y.S.2d 706, (2000)

NY Underlying tort action

Student Contributor: Jason Zemsky

Facts: Plaintiff was injured when she tripped and fell on a stair case at an LIRR station. The plaintiff retained the defendant to represent her in the action, but the defendant failed to timely commence an action on her behalf. The plaintiff then brought an action for legal malpractice against the defendants. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied.

Issue: Did genuine issues of materials facts exist that the plaintiff could have proved to prevail if the defendant had timely commenced an action?

Ruling: Affirmed.

“To state a claim for legal malpractice, the plaintiff must show that the defendants failed to exercise the skill commonly exercised by an ordinary member of the legal community, that such negligence was the proximate cause of damages, and that ‘but for’ such negligence the plaintiff would have prevailed on the underlying action.”

Contrary to the defendants' contention, it cannot be concluded as a matter of law that the defect in the staircase was of such a trivial nature that it could not have given rise to a legal liability on the part of the LIRR. There is an issue as to whether or not the plaintiff would have prevailed against the LIRR had the defendants filed a timely action.  

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Builders Square, inc. v. Saraco,  868 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

PA. underlying products liability suit

Student contributor: Cheryl Neuman

Facts: Plaintiff was a defendant in an underlying products liability lawsuit. Plaintiff was a retailer of the allegedly defective product. The distributor of the product was also named as a defendant. The distributor had $1 million of liability insurance coverage. Plaintiff retained defendant lawyer in the product liability suit. The plaintiffs in the underlying products liability offered to settle for $1 million, which was the limit of the insurance policy. Defendant lawyer, however, rejected the offer to settle and did not inform his client (plaintiff) about the settlement offer. After plaintiff found out about the settlement offer defendant attorney withdrew from representation. At trial, the parties agreed to settle for $4.25 million, of which the plaintiff was responsible for $3.25 million. Plaintiff therefore alleges that defendant’s failure to pursue the earlier settlement agreement placed plaintiff in a much weaker position to defend or settle the case.

Issue: Does a lawyer have the duty to explore and timely communicate to his client all settlement offers?

Ruling: Yes. An attorney had the duty to tell his client about all settlement offers as well as other important information relating to the representation.

Lesson:  The plaintiff in this case was dissatisfied  at having to settle a case on terms that were more disadvantageous than the terms of  the initial settlement negotiations.  Allowing this type of lawsuit to go forward heightens awareness and provides incentives to lawyers to fully communicate all settlement offers to their clients. It is, after all, the client's right to settle the case. 

Editor's Note: See RPC 1.4 re the lawyer's duty to communicate to the client. 

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Lawrence v. Miller 48 A.D.3d 1, 853 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dept., 2007)

Student Contributor: Maninder (Meena) Saini

NY Underlying Estate Litigation-Attorney fees

Facts: A husband passed away and left the estate to respondent-wife and their three children. The will was admitted to probate in January 1982. The respondent (Lawrence) retained the Graubard law firm on an hourly basis to represent her in connection with the estate. Respondent was billed over $18 million in legal fees over a 22-year lengthy dispute over the estate. Throughout the years, more than $350 million in distributions were made to the beneficiaries. To conclude the litigation, a $60 million settlement was offered but the respondent declined. The respondent then renegotiated the existing agreement with the law firm. The law firm would continue to get an hourly rate, but there was an annual cap of 1.2 million. In addition, the agreement contained a 40% contingency fee provision for any additional monies that were distributed to the beneficiaries. Months later, the law firm reached a settlement agreement for approximately $104.8 million. The respondent refused to pay the law firm the 40% of the additional $40 million it obtained. The law firm filed a petition to compel payment. The respondent then brought a lawsuit for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty.

Issue: Whether the revised contract that contained a contingency fee of 40% of any future monies distributed to the beneficiaries is unconscionable on its face.

Ruling: The court found that a 40% contingent legal fee of $40 million for five months work was not unconscionable on its face, especially following years of litigation. Thus, the law firm did not breach any fiduciary duties.

 “Any determination of unconscionability generally requires a showing of both procedural and substantive unconscionability, requiring an examination of the contract formation process and the alleged lack of meaningful choice.”

Lesson: Should it be unconscionable for an attorney to place high contingency fees in the retainer agreement when the attorney is investing his time and risking collecting nothing in the event of a loss? The attorney must demonstrate that he did not exploit the situation and that the client understood the terms of the agreement. Even though it may seem excessive at first blush, the circumstances underlying the agreement must be fully evaluated. Agreements are to be enforced when no deception is involved in making the contract between competent adults. 

Editor's Note: The "bottom line" is given all the circumstances, the fee must be reasonable. RPC 1.5 (a). 

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Helmar v. Harsche, 296 N.J. Super. 194 (App. Div. 1996)

NJ: Underlying real estate transaction

Student Contributor: Michael H. Park

Facts: Plaintiff purchased a triplex rental property from broker partly based upon broker's representation that the building was up to code and did not require any licenses in order to rent the premises. The broker told plaintiff to retain an attorney to review the contract and to handle the closing. The plaintiff then retained an attorney, who failed to check that the building was in compliance with all laws and regulations. Subsequently, the property was inspected and found to be in violation of twenty-one different codes. Plaintiff filed a complaint against broker alleging, fraud, consumer fraud, and negligence. Before a motion judge and again at trial, the broker sought to name attorney as a third-party defendant, contending that his malpractice was the superseding intervening cause of the plaintiff's damages. However, the broker’s motion was dismissed and judgment was entered for plaintiff. The broker appeals the dismissal of its motion.

Issue: Was the motion to join the attorney as a third-party defendant properly dismissed?

Ruling: In reversing the decision by the Superior Court, Law Division, the Appellate division held that the broker should have been allowed to join attorney as a third party defendant for the following reasons:
1) In Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J.Super. 581 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 72 N.J. 459 (1976), the court held:

“[When] an attorney undertakes a duty to one other than his client, he may be liable for damages caused by a breach of that duty to a person intended to be benefited by his performance.”

2) The broker presented expert testimony that established that once hired, it was the attorney’s duty to make sure the property was in compliance with the regulations. The expert opined that the attorney owed a fiduciary duty to the broker. Therefore, had the attorney done his job, there was a possibility that all the violations would have been revealed prior to closing.

Lesson: In cases where an attorney is called upon to handle a transaction between his client and a third party, a fiduciary duty may be owed to the third party. This duty demands that the attorney not only diligently pursue his client's interests, but also the interests of the third party in successfully completing the transaction. If this duty is breached, the attorney can be held liable for any damages arising from his negligence.

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Leder v. Spiegel, 9 N.Y.3d 836, 840 N.Y.S.2d 888 ( 2007)

Student Contributor: Maninder (Meena) Saini

NY Underlying will contest

Facts: Plaintiff (attorney) unsuccessfully represented defendants (clients) in a will proceeding and the defendants refused to compensate the plaintiff for the work done on their behalf. The plaintiff then petitioned for legal fees. The defendants counterclaimed for legal malpractice, alleging that “but for” the plaintiff’s negligent representation, which was failing to anticipate that certain evidence would be inadmissible, they would have settled. The plaintiff moved for an order dismissing the defendants’ counterclaim. The lower court dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim. Defendants appealed.

Issue: Did the defendants allege a prima facie case of legal malpractice?

Holding: The appellate division held that the defendants’ counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff failed to anticipate the court’s evidentiary ruling does not establish proximate cause. The plaintiff actively encouraged the defendants to settle but they refused to accept it. Thus, the defendants failed to make a prima facie case of legal malpractice. The lower court’s decision was affirmed.

Rule: “In order to sustain a legal malpractice claim, a client must establish that the attorney failed to exercise ordinary reasonable skill and knowledge commonly possessed by a member of the legal profession which results in actual damages, and that the client would have succeeded on the merits of the underlying action “but for” the attorney's negligence.”
Lesson: The plaintiff must be able to show that the attorney’s negligence was the proximate cause of the damages. The dismissal of a legal malpractice action is warranted if the plaintiff fails to demonstrate proximate cause regardless of whether the attorney was negligent. 

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Lawson v. Nugent, 702 F. Supp. 91 (D.N.J. 1988)

NJ Underlying Criminal Action

Student Contributor: Colleen Gaedcke

Facts: The plaintiff retained the defendant attorney as defense counsel after being indicted for the robbery of a post office. Upon the advice of the defendant attorney, plaintiff pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. While in prison, the plaintiff retained new counsel and obtained a reduction in his sentence. Eventually, he was released after serving 5 years.
Upon release, plaintiff brought a legal malpractice suit against the defendant attorney alleging that, but for the defendant’s negligent legal representation, he would have served a maximum of only 40 months in prison. The plaintiff sought damages for emotional distress as a result of the anguish he suffered for the additional 20 months he spent in prison, allegedly, as a result of his attorney’s ineffective representation.

Issue: Can a criminal defendant recover damages for emotional distress in a legal malpractice action?

Ruling: Yes. The United States District Court, District of New Jersey, held that the plaintiff may pursue emotional distress damages if he could first establish (1) the existence of some egregious or extraordinary circumstance; and (2) the allegedly negligent attorney was retained to protect something other the plaintiff’s economic interests.

Lesson: Given that the attorney-client relationship in a criminal proceeding is predicated upon the protection of the client’s interest in his freedom and sovereignty, “an attorney who commits malpractice is liable to his client for any reasonably foreseeable loss caused by his negligence, including emotional distress resulting from [his] loss of liberty."

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With this post, Legal Malpractice Law Review  inaugurates a new section called "Brain Teasers".

 All too often, common transactions we  come across  give rise to complicated legal malpractice (and ethics) issues. With "Brain Teasers" we challenge you to see the issues and discuss how you would approach their resolution. Feel free to post  and share with all of us your comments.

If you have a "Brain Teaser" to share, please email it to us at: experts@legalmalpractice.com. Make sure to use fictitious names. And we'll post it so that everyone can benefit. 

And now, Bill Freivogel, shares with us the Inaugural "Brain Teaser":

Eighteen months ago Tom represented the borrower in a loan transaction. Tom’s client is now in deep trouble and may be headed for bankruptcy court. One of the bankruptcy lawyers in the firm, Bob, while reviewing the loan transaction, notices that the remedies opinion in Tom’s closing opinion did not contain a critical provision dealing with bankruptcy. Bob goes to Tom and asks whether that omission was intentional. In looking at his notes Tom quickly realizes that his assistant had misinterpreted one of his edits. This could further complicate life for Tom’s already shaky client and for Tom’s law firm. Tom goes to his firm’s general counsel, Barbara and asks for guidance. Barbara pulls in another partner, Jerry, for a second opinion about what should have been done.

While the above scenario raises many issues, here are a few. First, what, if anything, must Tom tell his client? The trickier question is when must Tom tell his client. Second, are any of the communications that have just occurred within Tom’s law firm among Tom, Bob, Bill, Barbara, and Jerry, protected by the attorney-client privilege? This second issue will almost certainly arise if either Tom’s client or the lender sues Tom and his law firm for the mistake. Last, when, if ever, should the law firm notify its malpractice carrier or broker. What should the notice say?

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Salamoni v. Karoly, 2005 WL 3823056, 74 Pa. D. & C.4th 378 (Pa.Com.Pl. 2005)

PA Underlying personal injury claim

Student Contributor: Christopher S. Henn

Facts: Plaintiff suffered personal injuries after being struck by a car. Plaintiff engaged the Defendant attorney, Karoly, to seek recovery for his injuries in the accident. Defendants filed for issuance of a summons one day before the expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. It was issued the same day but expired a month later because it was never delivered to the sheriff for service.

After the summons was reinstated, however, Plaintiff's case was dismissed on summary judgment because of the expiration of the statute of limitations. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Karoly and his associate for legal malpractice. Despite naming two Defendants, Plaintiff submitted a single certificate of merit as to both defendants. The Clerk of the Court, therefore, dismissed the malpractice action for failure to prosecute.

Issue: Is a single certificate of merit sufficient where there are multiple defendants?

Ruling: The Court held:

It was not the clerk's function to evaluate the sufficiency of this certificate. The clerk was without authority to enter a judgment of non pros under these circumstances…Where several defendants acting together are responsible for the same negligent act or omission, a single certificate of merit naming both or all defendants [is sufficient].

Lesson: The purpose of filing a certificate of merit is to ensure that the Plaintiff has not asserted a frivolous claim against the Defendant for professional negligence. Although the Plaintiff here did not comply with the technical requirements of Pennsylvania’s Certificate of Merit rule for each separate Defendant, the Court found that the purpose of the requirement had been fulfilled “[w]here both parties [were] jointly responsible for the same negligent act or omission”.

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Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537 (2nd Cir. 1994)

NY Underlying Commercial Action/Conflict of Interest

Student Contributor: John Anzalone

Facts: Defendant law firm represented Plaintiff, through an agent, in her attempt to purchase the assets of a bankrupt company. Eventually, however, Plaintiff dismissed the agent. The agent, thereafter, advised Defendant law firm of his interest in purchasing the assets of the same bankrupt company.

Despite being fully aware that Plaintiff still sought to purchase the assets, Defendant law firm informed the Plaintiff that it would represent the agent in his attempt to purchase the assets, and despite Plaintiff’s objections, proceeded with the representation. Ultimately, the agent outbid Plaintiff with the firm's assistance.

The jury found that the firm's representation of Plaintiff's agent breached its fiduciary duties to her and was a "substantial factor in preventing her from obtaining assets she sought in the transaction."

Issue: Did the firm breach its duty to Plaintiff by representing her former agent in the same transaction?

Ruling: In affirming the lower court, the Second Circuit held that the firm had breached its fiduciary duty to Plaintiff, and reasoned as follows:

1. The firm committed a serious breach of its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff by representing a party with interests adverse to the Plaintiff in the same transaction.
2. The nature of this breach triggers the prophylactic rule so that, instead of establishing proximate cause, plaintiff has to prove only that the firm’s actions were a substantial factor in the resulting damages.
3. Here, the substantial factor test was satisfied given the likelihood that (a) the agent and the firm conspired to use Plaintiff’s escrow funds for the agent’s purchase of the bankrupt entity’s assets; (b) this conspiracy interfered with Plaintiff’s negotiations to purchase the same assets; and (c) the firm and the agent conspired to use confidential information regarding Plaintiff’s bid.

Lesson: If an attorney or a law firm terminates its relationship with one client and commences an engagement with another party with directly adverse interests in the same transaction, they will be subject to the “prophylactic rule” which makes it easier for a plaintiff to prove malpractice by substituting the usual "but for" causation in fact  requirement with the “substantial factor” test.

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Utica Mutual. Ins. Co. v. Maran & Maran, 142 N.J. 609 (1995)

NJ Underlying workers comp proceeding

Student Contributor:  Lisa Larato

Facts: Defendant Ingala sustained work related injuries and had been receiving workers compensation benefits from the Plaintiff, Utica Mutual Insurance Co. (Utica). Ingala retained a separate attorney to handle a products liability claim against the third party liable for his injuries. That attorney failed to file suit within the statute of limitations. Plaintiff then retained  Maran & Maran, to sue that attorney for malpractice. The malpractice suit settled for $585,000.

Utica contended that it had a workers compensation lien on the legal malpractice settlement proceeds, but Maran & Maran disagreed. Utica filed the instant lawsuit and the parties cross-filed for summary judgment. Maran & Maran argued that even if such a lien could attach to a legal malpractice recovery, it should not attach if the malpractice and workers compensation recoveries do not fully compensate the injured worker. They also argued that the workers compensation carrier had no claim because it failed to institute its own action against the tortfeasor.

The Superior Court, Law Division, granted Ingala and Maran & Maran’s motion and held that the lien did not attach to a malpractice recovery. Utica appealed, and the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. Utica then moved for reconsideration and the Supreme Court granted that motion.

Issue: Whether, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, a workers compensation lien attaches to the proceeds of a malpractice suit brought to recover damages from an attorney who failed to institute an action against the third-party tortfeasor?

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the statute establishing workers compensation liens prevents Maran & Maran from retaining any workers compensation benefits that have been supplemented by recovery against a liable third party, even if recovery and benefits when combined would leave Ingala less than fully compensated. Under N.J.S.A. 34:15-40, Utica is entitled to reimbursement, irrespective of whether or not Ingala is fully compensated.

Lesson: The Purpose of N.J.S.A. 34:15-40 is to prevent recovery from different sources for the same injury; no justification exists for allowing an injured employee who receives a legal malpractice recovery to be in a better position than an injured employee who recovers directly from the tortfeasor. The court reasoned that the “no double recovery” rule should not be different when the third-party recovery is against a party other than the tortfeasor.

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